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Women And The Making Of The Tunisian 
Constitution 
Rangita de Silva de Alwis* 
 Anware Mnasri** 
 Estee Ward*** 
“The best nations are always those that accord women the greatest amount of liberty.” 
 
(Charles Fourier, 1808) 
 
“Just because we’ve overthrown the regime and managed to cobble together a constitution 
does not mean the transition is over. It is only the beginning. People need to remember 
that.” 
 
(Issrar Chamekh, Student and Tunisian activist at i-Watch.) 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Jasmine Revolution of 2011 and the cascade of revolutions that 
followed created a crucial, albeit narrow, window of opportunity for political 
changes that could shape legal system reform across the Middle East and North 
African (MENA) region.1 Revolutionaries in Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, and 
Libya pushed for constitutional change as a necessary first step towards 
transitioning to a more democratic state.2 Within this discourse, constitutional 
reform movements became platforms for addressing deep-seated gender 
inequalities.3 Women in Tunisia used their country’s constitution-making 
 
 1.  See generally Katerina Dalacoura, The 2011 Uprisings in the Arab Middle East: Political 
Change and Geopolitical Implications, 88 INT’L AFFAIRS 63 (2012) (discussing the causes of the 
Arab Spring and its potential geopolitical implications). 
 2.  John Liolos, Erecting New Constitutional Cultures: The Problems and Promise of 
Constitutionalism Post-Arab Spring, 36 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 219, 221-24 (2013); see also 
Issandr El Amrani, Op-Ed., Egypt: A Constitution First, GUARDIAN COMMENT NETWORK, Jun. 12 
2011, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/jun/12/egypt-a-constitution-first. 
(describing a statement by Egyptian activists that recommends the Tunisian model of political 
transition). 
 3.  See, e.g., RAINER GROTE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISLAMIC COUNTRIES: BETWEEN 
UPHEAVAL AND CONTINUITY 628, 673 (2012). For a closer look at the popular debates around 
gender-related issues in North African countries between 2011 and 2013, see generally ANDREA 
KHALIL, CROWDS AND POLITICS IN NORTH AFRICA: TUNISIA, ALGERIA, AND LIBYA (2014). 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol35/iss1/3
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process as a vehicle for mobilizing local efforts, connecting with gender rights 
advocates in other MENA countries, and participating in a transnational 
dialogue.4 As a result, women’s participation became a key determinant of some 
of the final draft’s constitutional guarantees on gender equality, religion-state 
relations, rights in the family, rights to political participation, and the 
employment of programmatic rights.  
The constitution-making process in Tunisia built upon a long history of 
attempts in other countries to shift from a top-down model of constitution-
making, also known as the Lancaster Model, to one based on popular 
participation.5 Over 200 new constitutions have been drafted since the post-
colonial era.6 The earliest projects relied heavily on international experts outside 
the country who either copy-pasted model provisions from international texts or 
else borrowed from the country’s former colonizers.7 Since the 1980s, however, 
countries have worked to adopt more autochthonous or hybrid processes that fit 
the local context.8 This is based on the premise that popular participation in 
constitution-making not only lends legitimacy to the text’s provisions, but is in 
itself an exercise of democratic empowerment.9 In other words, constitutions can 
provide new beginnings for a country; in post-conflict scenarios, they give 
countries a forum for discussing the underlying tensions that gave rise to the 
initial conflict.10 The more open a constitution-making process is to the public 
and the institutions of civil society, the more likely the process will be more 
democratic and representative.11 
Based on these underlying principles, a nation’s drafting process has been 
characterized generally by a greater degree of deliberation and is most often led 
either by the standing legislature or by a nationally elected constituent 
 
 4.  Giulia Daniele, Tunisian Women’s Activism after the January 14 Revolution: Looking 
within and towards the Other Side of the Mediterranean, 15 J. INT’L WOMEN’S STUD. 16, 26-27 
(2014). 
 5.  Upendra Dev Acharya, Constitutionalism and Democracy in Nepal: What Went Wrong? 
in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS: LESSONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA 177,188-
91 (Veronica Federico & Carlo Fusaro eds., 2006). Alternative approaches to the Lancaster Model 
emerged in the late 1990s. Frameworks vary, but the general consensus is that popular participation 
is highly desirable, if not essential to successful constitution-making.  
 6.  Jennifer Widner, Constitution Writing in Post-Conflict Settings: An Overview, 49 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1513, 1523 (2008).  
 7.  Benedikt Goderis & Mila Versteeg, The Diffusion of Constitutional Rights, 39 INT’L REV. 
L. & ECON. 1 (2014).  
 8.  Heinz Klug, Postcolonial Collages: Distributions of Power and Constitutional Models, 18 
INT’L SOC. 114, 126-28 (2003).  
 9.  VIVIEN HART, DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION-MAKING (2003), 
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr107.pdf.  
 10.  Jamal Benomar, Constitution-Making After Conflict: Lessons for Iraq, 15 J. DEMOCRACY 
81, 87 (2004).  
 11.  See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg et al., Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?, 5 ANN. 
REV. L. SOC. SCI. 201, 202-206 (2009) (providing a brief literature review on the waves of 
constitutionalism and a wider discussion of the dynamics between public participation and 
constitutional design). 
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assembly.12 Although the emphasis is on creating a text that embodies a people’s 
history and values, countries in transition will often draw on a “collage of 
constitutional mechanisms and principles” at the international level to “produce 
hybrid solutions tailored to” local imperatives.”13 A more recent approach 
among legal scholars has been to look at the degree to which newly drafted 
constitutions are “intermestic” – drawing on both domestic and international 
influences.14 The hybridization of state reconstruction and the degree to which it 
occurs has been particularly informative in the area of women’s rights. In many 
instances, women who have played an active role in advancing gender equality 
through constitutional reform have relied at least in part on a common core of 
international norms reflected in instruments such as the Convention for the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant 
for Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).15 They have used such texts 
to reinforce their assertion that participation in the drafting process is not just 
critical to the end result, rather it must be acknowledged as a normative claim in 
and of itself.16 The right to participate in the decision-making affecting women’s 
lives is one of the most significant rights to be claimed by women. The United 
Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women has 
supported a women’s right to engage in constitution-making, stating: 
“[G]ender-sensitive processes (e.g., guaranteeing women’s representation 
in constitutional drafting bodies) and decisions on substance (e.g., 
adoption of a constitutional guarantee of gender equality) set a precedent 
for women’s participation in social, economic, and political life in the 
post-conflict period, as well as providing a legal base from which 
women’s rights advocates can demand other types of gender-responsive 
reform that unfolds in transitional periods when laws and institutions are 
in flux.”17 
This is not to say that the women who participate in the drafting process 
should be characterized as a uniform force. Context will inevitably shape and 
diversify women’s views of what warrants constitutional protection and whether 
 
 12.  Widner, supra note 6 at 1532. 
 13.  Klug, supra note 8 at 128. 
 14.  Kevin L. Cope, The Intermestic Constitution: Lessons from the World’s Newest Nation, 
53 VA. J. INT’L L. 667, 724 (2013). 
 15.  Diane Elson & Jasmine Gideon, Organising for Women’s Economic and Social Rights: 
How Useful Is the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights? 8 J. 
INTERDISC. GENDER STUD. 133, 135-138 (2004). 
 16.  See generally HELEN IRVING, GENDER AND THE CONSTITUTION: EQUITY AND AGENCY IN 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN (2008) (reviewing various strategies and mechanisms to 
enhance women’s participation in the constitution drafting process and the significance of such 
participation). 
 17.  RANGITA DE SILVA DE ALWIS, WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS AND NATIONAL 
CONSTITUTIONS: LEADERSHIP AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION (2012), 
http://www2.unwomen.org/~/media/field%20office%20eseasia/docs/publications/2014/9/womens%
20human%20rights%20and%20national%20consitutions%20guidance%20note.ashx?v=1&d=20141
202T120321. 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol35/iss1/3
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international human rights standards comport with local belief systems or 
cultural practices. In Tunisia, women’s participation consisted of a complex set 
of interactions influenced by stakeholders with varying and sometimes 
conflicting socio-political objectives. The inconsistencies that appear in the 
constitution’s final text, as well as some of the challenges to passing 
implementing legislation, are a testament to this.18 Yet the ways in which 
participation unfolded, the forces at play, and their differing interests in drafting 
the country’s gender rights provisions are issues that remain understudied. This 
article attempts to glean from field interviews and secondary sources some of 
the sociopolitical complexities that underlay women’s engagement in Tunisia’s 
constitution-making process. Elucidating such complexities can provide further 
insight into how women’s engagement impacted the substance and 
enforceability of the constitution’s final text. We argue that, in spite of 
longstanding roadblocks to implement and enforce constitutional guarantees, the 
greater involvement of Tunisian women in the constitution drafting process did 
make a difference in the final gender provisions of Tunisia’s constitution. 
Although not all recommendations were adopted, Tunisian women were able to 
use an autochthonous process to edify the country and set the foundation for 
greater rights consciousness. 
This article also seeks to define the degree and nature of external influence 
on national efforts to advance women’s rights and on the drafting of Tunisia’s 
gender provisions. Although our research suggests that international forces had 
less of an impact on the Tunisian constitution-making process than we had 
assumed initially, we also found that many Tunisian women still saw themselves 
as part of a transnational women’s movement in which they were able to engage 
with a broad network of international women’s groups and transnational 
stakeholders. Our conclusion, thus, is that the Tunisian constitutional project, at 
least in regards to its gender provisions, can be regarded as intermestic in the 
sense that it drew directly or indirectly from both local and transnational 
sources. This shows that even when drafters are able to create constitutions that 
fit local contexts, they are still deeply influenced by international human rights 
provisions and relevant structural frameworks. 
Finally, this article summarizes some of the early efforts to translate 
constitutional guarantees into enforceable legislation. While we have deemed 
Tunisia’s drafting process as a success in participatory constitution-making, the 
country has a considerable way to go to ensure that “equal opportunities for men 
and women” as guaranteed in its new constitution become a reality for Tunisians 
in their daily modes of existence.19 
Applying Tunisia as a case study more generally, we argue 
that women’s equal engagement can inform the constitutive and transformative 
nature of constitution drafting. Such engagement allows civil society to address 
challenges to the empowerment of women, create new narratives of nation 
 
 18.  See infra Part II. 
 19.  TUNISIAN CONSTITUTION OF 2014, Jan. 27, 2014, art. 46. 
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building, and ensure that constitutional provisions are drafted in a gender-
sensitive manner. Women’s engagement should be premised on a dialogic, 
human rights, analytical framework. While the primacy of rights must guide 
constitutional change, international human rights must be premised on an 
ongoing discourse that calls for simultaneous internal and cross-cultural 
dialogue involving a plurality of voices, including the equal representation of 
women. The emphasis here is on “ongoing.” Constitutional guarantees are not 
guarantees until they are enforced without bias or exception. Participation in 
constitution-drafting projects should not end with the final text, but must 
continue with the formation of institutions that reflect and maintain the 
constitution’s blue print for nation building. 
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a historical overview of 
Tunisia’s constitution-making process and defines the major stakeholders 
involved, as well as the varying dynamics among them. It then introduces a 
comparative summary of how other countries have gradually shifted from the 
Lancaster Model to a more participatory process that embraces women’s 
inclusion in drafting constitutional rights provisions. Part II begins our case 
study of Tunisia by detailing how some of the stakeholders mentioned in Part I 
shaped the drafting process for certain gender provisions, the proposed texts as 
well as subsequent revisions. Part II concludes by identifying some of the 
inconsistencies found within the constitution’s final text, as well as preexisting 
laws that have complicated the enactment of implementing legislation. Part III 
moves on to consider the international forces involved in the drafting process, 
and the extent to which international texts and softer modes of influence 
determined the direction of Tunisia’s internal dialogue. It also considers whether 
international organizations have played a part in resolving inconsistencies in the 
legal framework. Finally, Part IV makes recommendations to actualize the 
constitution’s gender provisions. It looks at the beginnings of some of these 
efforts, as well as gives recommendations based on the experience of other 
countries in transition. 
This paper engages not just in textual interpretation and secondary sources, 
but relies on in-depth interviews with some of the women stakeholders involved. 
Our hope is that by speaking with those who were present on the ground during 
the drafting process, we can provide greater insight into how provisions are 
drafted, to what extent the participatory process succeeded in creating new 
constitutional norms for a country in transition, and to what effect international 
sources had in driving the constitution to a particular end result. 
PART I 
A. A Summary of Women’s Engagement in Tunisia’s Constitution-making 
Process 
Any consideration of women’s participation in drafting a new constitution 
in Tunisia requires placing it in its historical context. The next section will 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol35/iss1/3
DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.15779/Z38B56D41P
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summarize the state of women’s activism prior to the revolution, the 
sociopolitical complexities that challenged participation in the constitution 
making process, and how women were able to coalesce in spite of these 
challenges. Women’s activism has a long history in Tunisia. The literary works 
of the author and reformer Tahar el-Haddad are hailed by many today as the 
genesis of progressive women’s rights in Tunisia.20 His book, Our Women in 
Shari’a and in Society (1930) inspired debate over the role of women in 
Tunisian society and laid the groundwork for future popular struggles.21 Haddad 
was also a pioneer of trade unionism in Tunisia, laying the groundwork for 
today’s largest and most powerful labor union in Tunisia, the General Union of 
Tunisian Workers (UGTT).22 His scholarship on women’s status in Tunisia was 
informed, at least in part, by his critique of capitalism and familiarity with 
European Marxism.23 Interestingly, Haddad’s works seemed to have influenced 
the reforms included in Tunisia’s Personal Status Code (CSP), issued by the 
country’s first president Habib Bourguiba in 1956.24 The purpose behind the 
CSP, however, seems to have been less about feminism than about doing away 
with traditions that impeded Bourguiba’s greater modernization program.25 The 
Code abolished polygamy and the practice of repudiation, and granted women 
suffrage and the right to initiate divorce, but did not explicitly make men and 
women equal in all respects.26 For example, the CSP adopted a male preference 
in inheritance law.27 Though the CSP was hailed by Western observers as a 
marked improvement in the institutionalization of women’s rights, it had the 
paradoxical effect of creating a Jacobin-like form of feminism that effectively 
silenced alternative feminist viewpoints.28 State feminism thus became a strategy 
to silence opposition while gaining the affections of external allies. 
This strategy evolved during the Ben Ali regime to include methods of co-
optation and division for the purposes of creating a narrow spectrum of activism 
that allowed women’s organizations to exist only within a limited, heavily 
monitored sphere.29 Those who resisted the regime’s tactics ultimately lost out 
 
 20.  Lilia Labidi, The Nature of Transnational Alliances in Women’s Associations in the 
Maghreb: The Case of AFTURD and ATFD in Tunisia, 3 J. MIDDLE EAST WOMEN’S STUD. 6, 9-12 
(2007). 
 21.  Id. For more information on the creation and development of women’s organizations 
inspired by el-Haddad, see LAURIE A. BRAND, WOMEN, THE STATE, AND POLITICAL 
LIBERALIZATION 202-22 (1998). 
 22.  JOEL BEININ, WORKERS AND THIEVES: LABOR MOVEMENTS AND POPULAR UPRISINGS IN 
TUNISIA AND EGYPT 13 (2016). 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  BRAND, supra note 21 at 178-79.  
 25.  Id. at 180. 
 26.  George N. Sfeir, The Tunisian Code of Personal Status (Majallat Al-Ahw Al Al-Shakhsiy 
Ah), 11 MIDDLE EAST J. 309, 310 (1957). 
 27.  Id. at 313-14. 
 28.  Daniele, supra note 4 at 18-19. 
 29.  Emma C. Murphy, Women in Tunisia: Between State Feminism and Economic Reform, in 
WOMEN AND GLOBALIZATION IN THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST: GENDER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 169-
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on political resources and influence but maintained an independent form of 
feminism that took hold after the regime’s fall. For example, The Tunisian 
Association of Democratic Women (ATFD) and The Association of Tunisian 
Women for Research on Development (AFTURD), both established in 1989, 
successfully avoided “dictatorial drift”30 to become powerful forces of post-
regime activism, as we will see below.31 On the international front, Tunisia 
continued to hold itself as a progressive Arab state, ratifying CEDAW in 1985, 
albeit with numerous reservations related to Article 9(2) on equal rights with 
regard to nationality of children, Article 16 on equality in marriage and family 
life, and Article 29(1) relating to the administration of CEDAW provisions.32 
Ben Ali became a vocal proponent of women’s economic participation, touting 
state laws with regards to maternity leave and equal employment, but made little 
actual efforts towards placing women in positions of leadership or providing 
them with enforceable safeguards against substandard working conditions.33 
In light of Tunisia’s complicated history, the 2011 revolution provided a 
critical opportunity to replace the old hegemonic framework for women’s rights 
with a new bottom-up model based on popular discourse and civil society-led 
initiatives. Dr. Najet Limam-Tnani of the University of Tunis has commented 
that the constitutional process “created a new pulse” for the women’s 
movement.34 On October 23, 2011, over seven months after the fall of the 
regime, the interim government held nationwide elections to determine the 
composition of a 217-member, National Constituent Assembly (NCA) tasked 
with drafting a new constitution.35 Women were well represented in most NCA 
decision-making bodies, though only a handful of women were appointed to 
significant positions of leadership.36 Many more women deputies joined the six 
constituent committees in charge of drafting provisions under specific 
 
70, 178-87 (Eleanor Abdella Doumato & Marsha Pripstein Posusney eds., 2003). 
 30.  Guadalupe Martínez-Fuentes & Belhassen Ennouri, Changes and Persistence in the 
Tunisian Organisational Network for the Promotion of Women, in PROMOTING WOMEN’S RIGHTS & 
GENDER EQUALITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 139 (2014), http://www.feps-
europe.eu/assets/bd3344d3-a0fc-4582-9842-
e3b8ea4724a4/2014%2009%2003%20women’s%20rights%20mena_final.pdf. 
 31.  See infra Part II. 
 32.  Declarations, Reservations, and Objections to CEDAW, U.N. , 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm (last accessed Oct. 25, 2016). 
 33.  Louisa Dris-Ait-Hamadouche, Women in the Maghreb, in NORTH AFRICA: POLITICS, 
REGION, AND THE LIMITS OF TRANSFORMATION 202, 219 (Yahia H Zoubir & Haizam Amirah-
Fernandez, eds., 2008). 
 34.  Najet Limam-Tnani, “Quelle Révolution Pour les Femmes Tunisiennes: Printemps 
Féministe our Hiver Islamiste?” Upholding Gendered Peace at a Time of War Conference, in Beirut, 
Lebanon (June 9, 2015).  
 35.  Lizzy Davis, Tunisian Elections: Polling Day as it Happened, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 23, 
2011, http://www.theguardian.com/world/middle-east-live/2011/oct/23/tunisian-elections-2011-arab-
and-middle-east-protests. 
 36.  NAT’L DEMOCRATIC INST. FOR INT’L AFFAIRS, ASSEMBLEE NATIONALE CONSTITUANTE 
DE LA TUNISIE, https://www.ndi.org/files/Tunisia-Gender-Assessment-National-Constituent-
Assembly-FRE.pdf. 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/bjil/vol35/iss1/3
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constitutional themes. Notably, the only committee headed by a woman was the 
Committee on Human Rights and Liberties, which was responsible for most 
issues related to women’s rights.37 
The NCA held its inaugural session on November 22, 2011 and drafting 
began shortly thereafter, on February 13, 2012.38 The entire project resulted in 
four drafts of the Constitution and took a little under two years to complete. The 
final draft was passed by an article-by-article vote on January 26, 2014. From 
the beginning there was consensus among women NCA members that the new 
constitution must uphold and advance women’s rights. To that end, women took 
steps to form a caucus that would promote a unified women’s rights agenda. 
However, diverging conceptions of what such an agenda should look like or 
what the role of women in Tunisian society should be impeded the caucus’ 
capacity to hold together as a unifying force. Though women deputies expressed 
in interviews a broad range of perspectives on women’s rights in Tunisia, most 
gravitated towards either a moderate Islamist position espoused by the majority 
party, Ennahda, or the modern secularist position of Ennahda’s biggest rival, 
Nidaa-Tounis. Even when women’s views aligned, these political parties were 
less than eager for their members to be drawn off to an issue-based coalition that 
crossed party lines. While Nidaa-Tounis feared that Ennahda was not as 
‘moderate’39 as it held itself out to be and thus might undermine safeguards set 
by the Bourguiba regime in the country’s 1959 Personal Status Code, Nidaa-
Tounis was repeatedly accused of fraternizing with crony capitalists and 
political elites under the prior regime. Though Ennahda, and in particular 
Ennahda’s women members, insisted on demonstrating good intentions in both 
maintaining and furthering women’s rights guarantees, anti-Islamist rhetoric 
exacerbated tensions between the two parties and inevitably created an 
atmosphere of mutual suspicion that often led to serious blockages during 
constitutional debate. In short, the caucus initiative never fully formalized, 
though women members did re-coalesce at crucial moments to push through 
certain rights provisions, most notably Article 46 requiring the state to take steps 
towards eliminating violence against women. 
 
 37.  THE CARTER CENTER, THE CONSTITUTION-MAKING PROCESS IN TUNISIA: FINAL REPORT 
2011-2014, 32 (2014).  
 38.  NCA to Hold Inaugural Session on November 22, TUNIS AFRIQUE PRESSE (Nov. 12, 
2011), http://www.pm.gov.tn/pm/actualites/actualite.php?lang=en&id=5058; see also Al-Bawsala, 
Drafting the Constitution of the Tunisian Republic (in Arabic), (Sep. 2012), 
http://www.albawsala.com/uploads/documents/Projet_Brouillon_Constit.pdf. 
 39.  Since its foray into the political scene, Ennahda has held itself out as the latest 
reincarnation of a moderate Islamist movement led by activists and Islamic intellectuals from the 
early 1980s onwards. Ben Ali used an aggressive form of secularism to suppress the movement’s 
growth and bar its presence in associative spaces. By contrast, Nidaa-Tounis became a loose 
conglomeration of leftists, progressivists, and secularists, some of whom were suspected to be a part 
of the “old guard.” Divisions between the two parties, thus, were not purely ideological, but also 
driven by historical circumstances.  Interview with Salsabil Klibi, Professor at La Faculté des 
Sciences Juridiques (May 27, 2015). 
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Similar divides created challenges for building a united women’s rights 
movement outside of the NCA. Rapid liberalization of the associative space 
after the revolution resulted in a flourishing of  women’s interest groups, 
representing a wide variety of perspectives.40 This explosion of civic action was 
positive in many ways, but it also created difficulties in finding common ground. 
The most visible debate largely mapped onto what was unfolding in the NCA. 
Older progressivists, popularly referred to as the “Daughters of Bourguiba,” 
often were at loggerheads with younger Islamists who championed themselves 
as the “Daughters of Khadija.”41 Supporters in both camps engaged in several 
competing demonstrations or marches that resulted in competing discourses over 
various women’s rights issues. On the sidelines, however, groups without 
political representation in the NCA were asserting their own views of the 
constitution and its role in furthering women’s rights. For example, proponents 
of political Salafism, a more extreme form of Islam that requires Shari’a law as 
the sole source for legislation, did not win any seats in the NCA but has gained 
traction since 2011, particularly among the urban poor and youth.42 Many 
Tunisian men and women who have felt their country has lost a sense of self 
have been drawn to Salafism because of its anti-establishment discourse and 
adherence to traditional values.43 Many Salafis reject the campaign for women’s 
rights as an imported Western construct unrepresentative of Tunisia’s own 
religious norms and values. The divisions between Salafis and other civil society 
groups resulted in several clashes with security forces and a wave of reported 
attacks against unveiled women and secular women’s associations.44 
Tunisian youth also expressed feelings of social and political 
marginalization during the drafting process. Though young Tunisians were 
critical stakeholders in the 2011 revolution and have remained vocal during the 
transition process, many have struggled post-revolution to find a political space 
in which they can push forward their interests. This is troubling, given that over 
54% of Tunisia is under the age of thirty and that youth have been one of the 
 
 40.  Some of the organizations mentioned in interviews include: Front of Women for Equality, 
Nawaas, Women and Dignity, Forum of Tunisian Women, Tunisian Association of Progressive 
Women, Voices of Women, Equality and Parity, Beity, League of Tunisian Women Voters. 
Moderate Islamist organizations such as Women and Complementarity, and the Tounissiet 
Association for Women and Development unified under a common banner to counter anti-Islamist 
discourse issued by modern secularists. 
 41.  Lamia Ben Youssef, Lecture at Oxford University (Oct. 27, 2014), (audio recording at 
https://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/daughters-bourguiba-daughters-khadija-mythical-genealogy-and-future-
secular-and-islamic). 
 42. See Monica Marks, Youth Politics and Tunisian Salafism: Understanding the Jihadi 
Current, 18 MEDITERRANEAN POL. 104, 110-111 (2013). 
 43.  See, e.g., id. (“Young women in the movement – for there are many female jihadi Salafis, 
though their activism is often self-segregated by sex – often appear to revel in expressions of gender 
performance, such as wearing niqab or refusing to shake hands and mix socially with young men. 
Such practices set them apart and seem to reinforce feelings of difference and, sometimes, 
superiority.”) 
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social categories most vulnerable to urgent issues, such as prolonged 
unemployment and domestic and economic violence.45 During the constitution-
making process, youth criticized the NCA as primarily representing an older 
generation that could not relate to young Tunisians’ experiences or share in a 
common set of values.46 This gave rise to a growing mistrust on the part of 
young people towards establishment organizations that appear to draw too close 
to political and business elites who benefitted under Ben Ali.47 Such criticism 
was reserved in particular for the UGTT and its fellow Quartet members.48 
While the UGTT proved crucial during the interim government as a moderator 
for brokering interests and held itself out during the drafting process as a 
representative of working-class interests, some felt that over time, it succumbed 
to internal fracturing and subsequent disenchantment among its youth chapters. 
Some even accused UGTT leadership as subservient to moneyed interests rather 
than to its core members.49 Disgruntled revolutionaries in their determination to 
stay relevant began assembling their own civil society initiatives including 
NGOs like Jamaity,50 media outlets like Nawaat,51 and watchdog groups like Al-
Bawsala.52 These new programs were intended to provide an alternative 
perspective to what was happening on the ground. NGOs and grassroots 
initiatives, lacking in domestic resources, often allied with foreign organizations 
for funding and outreach purposes.53 
These shifting alliances and mounting tensions in both the NCA and civil 
society is hardly surprising given Tunisia’s lengthy authoritarian history and 
sudden transition to a more democratic state. Yet it is remarkable that, in spite of 
these challenges, Tunisian women were still able to unite at critical junctures for 
 
 45.  See Graham Usher, The Reawakening of Nahda in Tunisia, MIDDLE EAST RESEARCH AND 
INFORMATION PROJECT (Apr. 30, 2011), http://www.merip.org/mero/mero043011. 
 46.  See Emily Parker, Tunisian Youth: Between Political Exclusion and Civic Engagement, 
TUNISIA LIVE (June 24, 2013), http://www.tunisia-live.net/2013/06/14/tunisian-youth-between-
political-exclusion-and-civic-engagement/. 
 47.  Kate McCabe, Dreams of January, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, 
https://www.ictj.org/dreams-january-tunisia/ (last accessed Oct. 25 2016). 
 48.  Anouar Boukhars, The Reckoning: Tunisia’s Perilous Path to Democratic Stability, 
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE (Apr. 2, 2015), 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/02/reckoning-tunisia-s-perilous-path-to-democratic-
stability/i5cj. The Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet includes UGTT along with three other civil 
society organizations. The group was instrumental in the drafting process and won the Nobel Peace 
Prize for its efforts in 2015. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Interview with Souhayel Hedfi, via Skype (June 9, 2015); see also Amel Boubekeur, 
Islamists, Secularists and Old Regime Elites in Tunisia: Bargained Competition, 21 
MEDITERRANEAN POL. 107, 111-15 (2016).  
 51.  NAWAAT EN FRANCAIS, http://nawaat.org/portail/fr/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2016). 
 52.  Infra notes 147-48. 
 53.  See Daniele, supra note 4, at 27. 
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the purpose of furthering women’s constitutional rights.54 While some women’s 
associations that pre-dated the revolution were discarded as “holdouts” of the 
Ben Ali era, others rose to become powerful forums of activism, maintaining 
political independence in order to build broad coalitions covering an array of 
organizations and corresponding interests. The ATFD and AFTURD were 
particularly effective in creating inter-organizational activities that centered on 
common—usually left-leaning—civic campaigns.55 One example of this was the 
LamEchaml network consisting of sixty organizations tied together by principles 
such as gender equality and separation of religion and state.56 There was also a 
concerted effort to repeal all existing reservations under CEDAW and 
incorporate its provisions in the constitutional text.57 ATFD and AFTURD thus 
became champions for causes that both radical grassroots organizations and 
conservative, politically-connected organizations could rally behind. 
The greatest coalescing moment for women’s groups came immediately 
after the NCA published its first draft on August 8, 2012.58 The draft text 
referred to the “complementarity” of women and men, a term that many women 
activists felt backslid away from protections under the CSP and threatened the 
campaign for greater gender parity.59 A mass sit-in was organized that same day 
in front of the NCA building and on August 13, Tunisian Women’s Day, 
thousands gathered across the country to support the equal protection of men 
and women under the constitution.60 
Women’s organizations were also effective as poll-watchers, rigorously 
monitoring the NCA while identifying inadequacies in the drafting process. 
Though many have applauded the NCA in its efforts to include civil society, as 
we will see in Part II, others felt the Assembly could have gone further. For 
example, the NCA only permitted one multi-day period during which civil 
society organizations were invited to come and engage in open dialogue with 
NCA members.61 Some organizations, including ATFD, LTDH, and 
International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH) boycotted this event, sensing 
that the discussion could not be productive if draft guarantees had not been set.62 
 
     54. See Tunisian Women and their Role in the Success of “The Jasmine Revolution”, DW 
News (Mar. 8 2011), http://www.dw.com/ar/ثثووررةة-إإننججااحح-ففيي-ووددووررههاا-االلتتووننسسييةة-االلممررأأةة-a/االلييااسسمميينن-
14896373 (translated by the author).  
 55.  Anna Antonakis-Nashif, Contested Transformation: Mobilized Publics in Tunisia between 
Compliance and Protest, 21 MEDITERRANEAN POL. 128, 135-36 (2016). 
 56.  Martínez-Fuentes, supra note 30, at 144. 
 57.  Id. at 139-40. 
 58.  Interview with Anware Mnasri (June 2, 2015).  
 59.  Id.  
 60.  THE CARTER CENTER, supra note 37, at 35. 
 61.  JASON GLUCK & MICHELE BRANDT, PARTICIPATORY AND INCLUSIVE CONSTITUTION 
MAKING: GIVING VOICE TO THE DEMANDS OF CITIZENS IN THE WAKE OF THE ARAB SPRING 9 
(2015). 
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Similarly, the NCA held only one national consultation process. Monitoring 
organizations expressed concern that the process was too rushed to be effective: 
the NCA held public sessions from December through January 2013 in all of 
Tunisia’s 24 governorates at a rate of six governorates per weekend.63 The first 
round of sessions commenced merely two days after the second draft’s 
publication on December 14, 2012, which resulted in low turnout and hardly 
gave citizens adequate time to review. Monitoring organizations also noted 
feelings of exclusion among youth—over 45% of individuals ages 15-29 felt 
like they were not involved in the drafting process and 56% indicated complete 
unawareness as to the substance of the draft provisions.64 
By spring of 2013, the situation seemed to be spiraling out of control. 
Growing resentment towards the NCA resulted in fallouts between political 
parties and their constituents. Deadlock during revision meetings and the 
inadvertent release of a third draft on April 22, 2013, did not increase 
confidence in the NCA’s ability to reach a satisfactory final draft. The 
assassination of opposition politician, Mohamed Brahmi triggered massive 
protests in July 2013 calling for the government to resign.65 Over sixty 
opposition members walked out of the NCA shortly thereafter.66 When a final 
draft was finally passed by an assembly vote on January 26, 2014, it came 
amidst much political unrest and uncertainty of the constitution’s future 
implementation.67 
The surrounding turmoil did not stop women deputies, with the support of 
civil society groups, from coming together in the final moments to pass critical 
provisions guaranteeing the equality of women, as well as state requirements to 
protect women against violence and abusive working conditions. Such notable 
steps in the advancement and protection of women’s rights should not be 
forgotten. We should applaud the efforts of women’s organizations in Tunisia to 
rally around common objectives, in spite of the divisions that seemed to 
permeate among them and the rest of society. 
B. Countries in Transition: Building a Public Participatory Framework for 
Gender Rights 
Stepping back from the constitution-making process in Tunisia and the role 
of women in enacting gender rights provisions, it is first helpful to look at what 
 
 63.  THE CARTER CENTER, supra, note 37, at 70. 
 64.  U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, ENQUETE NATIONALE SUR LES ATTENTES DES JEUNES À 
L’ÉGARD DU PROCESSUS CONSTITUTIONNEL ET DE LA TRANSITION DÉMOCRATIQUE EN TUNISIE: 
RAPPORT DE SYNTHE ̀SE 11 (2013). 
 65.  Suspect Arrested in Murder of Tunisian Opposition MP, AL-ARABIYA (Feb. 9, 2011), 
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/02/09/Suspect-arrested-in-murder-of-
Tunisian-opposition-MP.html. 
 66.  Tunisia Mourns Slain Soldiers, JORDAN TIMES, July 9, 2013. 
 67.  LA FACULTE DE SCIENCES JURIDIQUES DE TUNIS, PROCESSUS DE REDACTION DE LA 
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other countries have done as a common reference point. National constitutions 
are recognized today as the supreme law of the land and, as the source of their 
power, they define both the citizenship rights and the responsibilities that then 
serve to regulate institutions and government and hold decision makers of the 
state accountable to those rights. The specific way in which a country’s 
constitution shapes each aspect of state power will either facilitate or limit the 
opportunities for advancing gender equality. Over the last four decades, over 
200 new constitutions have been drafted, including many in post-conflict 
countries. These constitutions have been written in the Balkans, Cambodia, 
Lebanon, East Timor, Rwanda, Chad, Mozambique, Bougainville-Papua New 
Guinea, Nepal, and the Comoros, to name a few. They include countries 
emerging from colonization from French and British colonial empires and 
countries in Eastern and Central Europe after the collapse of Soviet Communist 
rule in 1991.68 
The Lancaster House Constitution, a top-down model of constitution 
making developed as part of the negotiations that led to Zimbabwe’s 
independence from the United Kingdom in 1980, is no longer considered a 
tenable model.69 The Lancaster House model relied on international experts 
outside the country to draft provisions without the participation of the people.70 
Constitutions following this method, primarily those during the period of 
decolonization after the Second World War, tended simply to copy the basic 
constitutional rules of their former colonial masters.71 Over the past few decades, 
however, constitution making has transformed from mimicking the constitutions 
of colonial rulers to either autochthonous constitution-making or hybrid 
processes that fit the local context.72 Even when peace accords were 
internationally forged or constitutions were informed by foreign experts, there is 
a general perception that constitutions from the 1980s onward have been shaped 
by a more participatory process, characterized by a greater degree of 
deliberation and most often led by a national constituent assembly.73 
Though the constitution-making process differs from country to country, it 
usually involves the following stages: (1) assessment of the need for a new 
constitution; (2) agreement on the rules concerning how to proceed with 
constitution-building; (3) establishment of a representative body to prepare a 
 
 68.  See generally Widner, supra note 6 (providing an overview of the constitution-writing 
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 70.  Id. 
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draft of the new constitution that includes a public consultation process; (4) 
consideration and debate of the draft; (5) referendum; (6) adoption of the new 
constitution; and (7) implementation.74 The country overviews below focus 
primarily on stages three, four, and seven. Our effort here is to show that 
constitution-making is an exercise in democratic empowerment and can help 
shape nation-building; that the constitution and democratic governance may lose 
legitimacy if people feel disenfranchised by the process. Public participation 
allows women and others who have been marginalized from democratic 
processes to claim a constitution as their own. National dialogue and civic 
education can address underlying causes of conflict and help citizens to define a 
national identity and a shared vision for the future. Although international law 
does not spell out rules for drafting constitutions, most of the constitution-
making processes of the past two decades have attempted this in different ways. 
Preparatory civic education, teaching both large constitutional principles and the 
finer details of the drafting and adoption processes has become a cornerstone of 
constitution-making.75 
The electoral rules and procedures that determine which interest groups are 
represented on constitution-building bodies are critical for guaranteeing the role 
of women in the process of drafting, revising, and adopting a constitution. The 
goal should be to design rules that promote a broad representation of women and 
overcome traditional gender biases that have led to women’s comparative social, 
economic, or educational disadvantage. For example, South Africa was the first 
country in which men and women sat in equal numbers in the constitution-
making body.76 Its constitution-making process is regarded as a good example of 
a participatory constitution-making process.77 Similarly, Nepal’s Interim 
Constitution established the Constituent Assembly to draft the new constitution 
on the basis of a mix of first-past-the-post elections, proportional representation, 
and appointments (with approximately 55% of candidates to be elected through 
proportional representation), and ensured women’s inclusion by requiring that: 
“political parties… take into account the principle of inclusiveness” while 
selecting candidates for first-past-the-post elections, and that “political parties… 
ensure proportional representation of the women, Dalit, oppressed 
communities/indigenous peoples, backward regions, Madhesi, and other 
Classes.”78 In addition, the Interim Constitution required that “at least one-third 
of such total number of candidates nominated… be women.”79 
Once the drafting process has begun, some countries have successfully 
used women’s charters as instruments for consolidating women’s rights 
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 75.  Benomar, supra note 10, at 88. 
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demands. Turning back to South Africa, this technique proved crucial for 
unifying the women’s movement where no unification had previously existed. In 
1992, the South African Women’s National Coalition began raising public 
awareness and promoting considerable debate on women’s issues. During this 
process it identified several major concerns: inclusivity in decision-making, 
promotion of women’s awareness and rights, gender equality and women’s 
unity.80 When the drafting of a new constitution began in April 1994, the South 
African Constituent Assembly began an expansive participatory process built on 
three major pillars of inclusivity, accessibility and transparency. 81  The first 
building block was an educational campaign (using newspapers, billboards, 
radio, TV and a hotline) to educate the public about cardinal constitutional 
issues and their right to participate in the constitution-making process.82 More 
than 1,000 educational workshops were held over a period of a year.83 Public 
consultations gave members of the Constituent Assembly the opportunity to 
meet with members of the community and all recommendations were 
transcribed and collated.84 Public consultations were also held on specific 
subjects, such as the bill of rights, the judiciary and the administration. 
The South African Constituent Assembly held two years of transparent 
deliberations with ample public input. All constitutional debates were published 
and broadcast, citizens could tune in to educational radio programs, and parties 
carried out consultations at the provincial level.85 Citizens at large submitted two 
to three million proposals and suggestions to the Assembly.86 As a result, the 
constitution of South Africa has enjoyed remarkably high legitimacy, 
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particularly in regards to women’s rights and programmatic rights affecting the 
status of women in South African society. 
Efforts to foster long-term public participation through adequate 
transparency have also been effective in other African countries, such as 
Namibia and Eritrea. In Namibia, the public was well-informed about 
constitutional issues through the election campaigns of political parties, and the 
national radio network helped educate the public on key issues. The Eritrean 
process’s initial public-education phase included four-day training seminars for 
around four-hundred Eritreans.87  These trainees would then conduct public 
consultations at the village level regarding the constitutional commission’s 
proposals. Comments were considered during the revision process. The third 
phase included the recordation and collection of opinions expressed at public 
debates in various localities around the revised version of those proposals.88 
In contrast, the Cambodian public never got to participate closely with the 
constitution drafting sessions and had little input in the text of its constitution.89 
Structural barriers excluded Cambodia’s human rights organizations from 
consultation and limited their role to lobbying the Constituent Assembly for 
stronger women’s rights provisions. With assistance from the UN mission, 
human rights organizations were able to promote civic education and raise 
public awareness of the constitution’s importance for human rights.90 Buddhist 
clergy were especially helpful at reaching people in remote areas. NGOs hosted 
members of the constituent assembly at public meetings.91  Villages were 
reached indirectly through leaflets, brochures, stickers, posters, and broadcasts.92 
It is unclear however, how this impacted the final version of the constitutional 
text and its implementation. 
Sometimes non-governmental organizations with deep networks into civil 
society can influence the content and direction of the constitution-making 
process. For example, in Nicaragua, the influential Luisa Amanda Espinoza 
Association of Nicaraguan Women (AMNLAE), a Sandinista mass organization, 
helped women participate in the open forums organized to evaluate the different 
drafts of the Constitution. AMNLAE helped women to understand the 
intricacies of writing a constitution and helped to explain technicalities by 
describing the constitution as the mother law and statutes as its progeny.93 Seven 
forays were held specifically for women. Women’s participation helped to 
change both the content of the Constitution and the discourse that followed its 
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promulgation. In calling for a more inclusive definition of family, the women’s 
groups challenged discrimination against children born out of wedlock. Women 
also advocated for equal pay for equal work and equality in the military. Even 
when they failed to reach their goals, such as establishing a right to divorce, 
women’s participation helped ignite a debate on issues that were hitherto 
considered taboo.94 
Facilitating public participation through a policy of transparency appears 
easier in an age of social media. Novel mechanisms that utilize social media 
platforms might be particularly successful in small states. In Iceland, a mass 
social media campaign was deployed as a key impetus for drafting the country’s 
constitution.95 Through media advertisements and social media, the drafters 
solicited the public at large to send messages and submit comments online.96 
These messages were posted after review and clearance by the council’s staff.97 
Daily posts by the council’s staff included interviews with council members on 
social media, and live broadcasts of the council’s weekly meetings appeared on 
the council’s website and on Facebook.98 
Transparency efforts, however, require a sense of security for effectiveness. 
A lack of security can inhibit true participation during the drafting process, even 
when there is a participatory framework in place. For example, in Afghanistan, 
official reports asserted that “the Ministry of Women’s Affairs collected ideas 
from women, which were forwarded to the Constitutional Commission.”99 The 
Ministry also held women’s community meetings in groups of 30-60 to have 
them prepare statements on their ideas to submit to the Constitutional 
Commission.100 Finally, the Ministry established community radio broadcasts 
and went to villages raising awareness of women about the Constitution. In spite 
of these efforts, the drafting process has been described as only a tepid step in 
the right direction with mixed end results. A number of organizations involved 
in the constitution-making process expressed that a pervading lack of security 
hampered women’s ability participate in the formal process, though the 
opportunity to participate was present in theory.101 
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Once provisions of the text have been adopted, stakeholders in the 
constitution-making process must continue efforts to ensure that constitutional 
guarantees are implemented in legislation to push new norms. The promise of a 
participatory constitution-making is fulfilled only when constitutional 
guarantees are enforceable. Unfortunately, few countries have created 
institutional arrangements and accountability frameworks that are successful. A 
part of enforceability is dependent on the precision of the text itself. In other 
words, some of the constitutional provisions go beyond the normative 
guarantees to enshrine institutional frameworks for the application of those 
norms. For example, the Rwandan Constitution in its preamble states that it is 
“committed to ensuring equal rights between Rwandans and between women 
and men without prejudice to the principles of gender equality and 
complementarity in national development.”102 However, it does not stop at the 
preamble—Chapter 2 of the Rwandan Constitution, which outlines the 
fundamental principle of the state, commits to “equality of all Rwandans . . . by 
ensuring that women are granted at least thirty percent of posts in decision-
making organs.”103   
Several constitutions recognize the multiple grounds of discrimination 
based on gender and require state action against such discrimination. For 
example, the South African Constitution prohibits discrimination based on sex, 
pregnancy, marital status and sexual orientation and binds both private and 
public actors to this guarantee. Section 9 of the South African Constitution calls 
for “legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons or 
categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.”104 The Ugandan 
Constitution also calls upon parliament to make relevant laws, including laws 
for “the establishment of an equal opportunities commission.”105 Article 48 of 
the Constitution of Paraguay was amended in 2011 to read: “Men and women 
have equal civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights. The State will 
promote the conditions and will create the adequate mechanisms for, making 
equality real and effective, by leveling [allanando] the obstacles that prevent or 
hinder its exercise and facilitating the participation of women in all areas 
[a ́mbitos] of the national life.”106 Though there is reason for skepticism as to the 
effectiveness in implementation, such provisions at the very least place a 
constitutional obligation on the state to establish mechanisms protecting against 
gender discrimination in its various forms. 
Finally, some countries have placed certain guarantees, such as equality in 
employment and the right to affirmative action, directly in the constitutional 
 
 102.  CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA MAY 26, 2003, preamble §10.  
 103.  Id. at art. 9 §4; see generally ELIZABETH POWLEY, RWANDA: THE IMPACT OF WOMEN 
LEGISLATORS ON POLICY OUTCOMES AFFECTING CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 2, (2007) (debating the 
significance and impact of gender equality provisions in Rwanda’s gender equality provisions). 
 104.  S. AFR. CONST., 1996, §9(2).  
 105.  CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA, 1995, art. 32 §2.  
 106.  CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF PARAGUAY, 1992, art. 48. 
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text. At a minimum, where a constitution contains provisions governing 
employment, such provisions should comprise a general guarantee of the right to 
work alongside a guarantee of equality or non-discrimination, such as stating 
that “The right to work is recognized and is equal for all” (Burkino Faso, see 
below) or requiring equal pay for equal work. Another set of more protective 
constitutional provisions are those which would explicitly prohibit employment 
discrimination on the basis of sex and/or gender, including specific aspects of 
labor rights such as access to employment and remuneration. For example, 
Article 35 of the Ethiopian Constitution provides that “[w]omen shall have a 
right to equality in employment, promotion, pay, and the transfer of pension 
entitlements.”107 Such specific rights guarantees can become important tools for 
advancing gender equality in a society, provided the protections for these 
guarantees are contained elsewhere and also apply to women. For example, 
Article 116(2) of the Greek Constitution guarantees affirmative action as a way 
to address a legacy of discrimination against women: “Adoption of positive 
measures for promoting equality between men and women does not constitute 
discrimination on the basis of sex. The State shall attend to the elimination of 
inequalities actually existing, especially to the detriment of women.”108 
Despite the importance of comparative practices,  the most important 
aspect of designing a strategy for national reconstruction is the critical role 
played by context.109 Strategies for creating and enforcing rights guarantees do 
not always migrate very effectively between countries.110 A plan that produces 
good results in one country cannot simply transfer itself wholesale to another. 
Too many of the enabling conditions will be different, and the opportunities and 
limits for promoting gender equality will vary depending on whether 
constitutional reform is post-conflict or an effort to revise an existing 
constitution. 
One kind of enabler that is often overlooked is the constitutional provisions 
defining the structure and mechanisms of government. Key structural issues that 
may impact gender equality relate to: whether government is decentralized (e.g., 
through federalism); the electoral system and its design (e.g., whether it includes 
gender quotas); and the relationship between the branches of government, 
including the role and composition of the judiciary and the extent to which 
gender is mainstreamed in legislative and administrative processes. The impact 
of decentralization on women’s rights will again vary depending on local 
conditions. On the one hand, women may have greater access to local decision-
making entities than at the national level, and may be able to achieve change 
that is more immediate and responsive to gender realities than that which comes 
from centralized governments. Local governments are also often mandated to 
implement laws that have particular relevance to women, such as family law, 
 
 107.  CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA, 1995, art. 35, §8. 
 108.  1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.] [CONSTITUTION] ART. 19.  
 109.  DE SILVA DE ALWIS, supra note 17, at 1-2. 
 110.  Id. 
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meaning that women may have a greater opportunity to participate more directly 
in government decisions that significantly impact their lives. However, at the 
same time, there may be resource constraints in local government centers, and 
traditional or religious authorities are more likely to dominate at local levels; 
both of these factors may limit the capacity of local government centers to fully 
advance women’s rights and gender equality. Moreover, devolution of power 
tends to benefit groups that are regionally or territorially defined (e.g. 
indigenous or other minority groups); because women are not a homogenous 
group, decentralization will not strengthen their autonomy but instead mean that 
their rights will vary from region to region. 
C. The Role of International Actors in Drafting Gender Sensitive Provisions 
The international arena has given unprecedented visibility to the plight of 
women globally. As a group of scholars have commented, “‘[w]omen’s rights as 
humans rights’ has become a familiar slogan, bandied about by even the most 
unlikely international bureaucrat.”111 There have been a slew of international 
efforts to tackle a range of issues related to the inequality of women, from 
domestic violence, to political representation, to freedom of choice in cases of 
abortion and reproductive health, as well as a right to decent working conditions, 
including maternity leave and the creation of safe spaces. Many of the 
constitutional provisions cited above are deeply influenced by international 
actors seeking to diffuse gender norms reflected in international law. The 
creation and application of treaties has been the most common and arguably 
most powerful tool for legitimizing calls for greater women’s rights and gender 
equality. Women’s rights activists on both the international and national level 
have pointed to provisions in widely ratified treaties and accepted interpretations 
of those provisions as the basis for incorporating such provisions at the national 
and subnational level. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) refers to the rights, 
freedoms, and equal protection for men and women in Articles 2, 7, 16, and 
25.112 Drawing on the UDHR, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) requires that “[e]ach State Party. . .undertakes to respect and to 
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the 
rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such 
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status.”113 Further, “[e]very citizen shall 
have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in 
article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions: (a) to take part in the conduct of 
 
 111.  Doris Buss et al., Introduction to ‘Sexual Movements and Gendered Boundaries: Legal 
Negotiations of the Global and the Local’, 14 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 5, 5 (2005). 
 112.  G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 113.  G. A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 2 
(Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]; S. Exec. Doc. D, 95-2 (1978); S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-19, 6 
I.L.M. 360 (1967). 
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public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives.”114 General 
Comment 25, paragraph 6 of the United Nations Human Rights Committee 
(UNHRC), the body responsible for protecting and promoting provisions of the 
ICCPR, further defines the conduct of public affairs to encompass constitution-
making processes.115 The UNHRC has likewise recommended that countries, 
particularly countries in transition, “should reopen talks on the constitutional 
reform in a transparent process and on a wide participatory basis.”116 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW), often referred to as the international bill of rights for 
women, more adequately defines discrimination on the basis of sex,117 and in 
Article 7 calls for states to ensure women’s equal rights to participate in political 
and public life and to have equal access to all aspects of civil society.118 It has 
been ratified by 189 countries, and the convention’s committee oversees 
ongoing efforts to incorporate its text and general principles at the national as 
well as local level.119 Beyond formal incorporation, however, the CEDAW 
General Recommendation No. 23 further clarifies Article 7 by stating that: 
“While removal of de jure barriers is necessary, it is not sufficient. Where 
countries have developed effective temporary strategies in an attempt to achieve 
equality of participation, a wide range of measures has been implemented.. . .”120 
The General Recommendation goes on to reiterate the Beijing Platform of 
Action and the need to close the gap between de jure and de facto rights of 
women in political participation.121 The General Recommendation states that 
only “if women’s participation reaches 30 to 35 percent (generally termed a 
“critical mass”) is there a real impact on political [life]”.122 
Finally, United Nation Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325, passed 
in 2000,  “[u]rges Member States to ensure increased representation of women 
 
 114.  ICCPR, supra note 113, at art. 25. 
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at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions 
and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict.”123 
This policy is further broadened in subsequent UNSC resolutions addressed in 
the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda, which calls for the increased 
participation of women in the processes and institutions of peace building and 
security.124 
There is little empirical evidence revealing to what extent international 
texts affirming women’s rights are incorporated and enforced as constitutional 
guarantees at the national level. Lack of clarity in this realm may be incidental 
to divisions in the literature on constitution-making more generally. Legal 
scholars on constitution-making have largely gravitated towards one of two 
poles: those who deem written constitutions as local creatures driven by the 
interests and values of national actors on the one hand, and those who see 
constitutions as amalgamations of external, transnational or international 
constructs on the other.125 The former, sometimes referred to as national-identity 
constitutionalism, views constitutions as texts that adopt unique identities 
reflective of a nation’s past experiences.126 Constitution-making should thus be 
primarily driven by locally-inspired political aspirations and commitments.127 
From this perspective, the framing of certain rights provisions and the way they 
interact with other substantive or structural/procedural provisions may differ 
depending on the social, political, and geographic contexts in which they 
emerged.128 While national identity and interests have historically been defined 
by a country’s political elites,129 scholars have moreover raised the normative 
claim that broad public participation stands as a barometer for the constitution-
making process’s overall legitimacy, as well as a harbinger for the constitution’s 
future effectiveness.130 Implicit within this claim is the idea that efforts to 
include a cross-section of the population from various geographic, 
socioeconomic, and ideological backgrounds reduces the risk of a top-down 
imposition of constitutional norms. 
 
 123.  S.C. Res. 1325, ¶ 1 (Oct 31, 2000). 
 124.  See generally Women, Peace and Security, U. N., 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/women/wps.shtml (last visited Oct. 26, 2016) (providing 
a list of all United Nations Security Council resolutions on gender and peacekeeping work).  
 125.  Denis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg, Theoretical Perspectives on the Social and Political 
Foundations of Constitutions, in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 3, 8-16 
(Denis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., 2015). 
 126.  See, e.g. GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY, 70, 133 (2010) 
(suggesting that constitutions are a reflection of norms, values and principles of a nation, and that the 
constitutional identity should evolve with and emerge from changes in national identity).  
 127.  Fredrick Schauer, On the Migration of Constitutional Ideas, 37 Conn. L. Rev. 907, 912 
(2005).  
 128.  See Galligan, supra note 125, at 11.   
 129.  Tom Ginsburg et al., Commitment and Diffusion: How and Why National Constitutions 
Incorporate International Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 201 (2008). 
 130.  Noah Feldman, Imposed Constitutionalism, 37 CONN. L. REV. 857, 858-60 (2005).  
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Alternatively, others describe constitution-making as an ongoing exercise 
in constitutional diffusion.131 Countries either borrow from foreign constitutions 
or draw from international templates intended to mainstream human rights 
language and propel a transnational movement of human rights norms.132 
Countries may choose to incorporate international human rights provisions as a 
way to gain clout and reputational benefits at the international level. Others see 
incorporation through the lens of soft coercion: a state’s more powerful allies 
may try to condition the terms of their relations or the provision of foreign aid 
on the enactment of certain provisions.133 Ideational theory argues that ideas are 
intrinsically influential,134 that their acceptance at the international level changes 
state behavior over time through modes of persuasion.135 Observing constitution-
making processes can provide insights into how and to what degree 
transnational norms are infused in the final text. For example, the involvement 
of international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), foreign NGOs and 
development or rule of law consultants may be evidence of diffusion.136 
Our research in Tunisia showcases the value of using both domestic and 
international texts to fortify constitutional rights guarantees. There has been a 
recent call to adopt a dualistic approach that observes both national and 
international influences at once.137 In “intermestic constitutionalism,” one would 
recognize both transnational and local processes.138 For example, South Africa’s 
1996 constitution, often touted as a model constitution for post-conflict 
countries, is a product of both international and national influences. South 
African scholar Heinz Klug has asserted that “a thin, yet significant international 
political culture” propelled the country towards a Western constitutional model 
in spite of its history of imperialism and apartheid, and that this resulted in the 
incorporation of treaty texts such as CEDAW, primarily in order to acquire 
international esteem.139 Yet South Africa’s preamble, which drives the object 
and purpose of the rest of the text, implicitly recognizes apartheid by noting the 
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“injustices of our past” and honoring “those who suffered for justice and 
freedom in our land.”140 Likewise, a recent case study by Cope on constitution-
making in Sudan suggests that rights provisions are largely driven by 
international actors, while structural/institutional elements of the constitution are 
more tightly controlled by local actors.141 Whether this exact combination of 
transnational and local elements is the most effective for guaranteeing gender 
rights for countries in transition is debatable. 
Nevertheless, there is value in recognizing that constitution-making 
processes may result in a confluence of local and international influences. The 
legitimacy of the final text may depend on striking an appropriate balance 
between the two and recognizing the ways in which they emerge. We see benefit 
in incorporating international human rights standards for women in rights 
provisions. We also encourage drawing on international or foreign law to guide 
administrative and judicial interpretations of the gender rights provisions when 
there are conflicts between them and other constitutional guarantees. External 
examples can also guide legislatures in adopting laws that integrate women’s 
rights standards with local context. The comprehensive guarantees of women’s 
human rights set out in international and regional law only become real when 
they are embraced—and made actionable—at the national level. This may only 
occur if international law is adapted to a people’s values, histories, memories, 
and blueprints for nation building. 
Tunisia’s constitution, while hailed as a product of national interests and 
broad grassroots engagement, still garnered much international attention and 
received the benefits of much international expertise. The degree to which both 
domestic and international influences played a role in drafting in constitutional 
guarantees for women’s rights is rather unclear. The next section thus will dive 
deeper into Tunisia’s process, looking at the stakeholders involved in 
constitution-making and the specific gender-specific provisions at issue. 
PART II 
A. A Participatory Constitutional Process 
Tunisia’s National Constituent Assembly was elected on October 23, 2011 
and was dissolved on January 26, 2014 when the new Constitution was 
promulgated.142 It took two years, three months and three days for the NCA to 
complete and pass a new constitution, though three draft texts were issued along 
the way. Drafting began on January 14, 2012, and a first draft of the 
Constitution was made available on August 13, 2012. The second draft was 
released on December 14, 2012. On April 22, 2013, a third draft of the 
constitution was introduced. The fourth draft followed shortly after, on June 1, 
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2013.143 After an intense period of debate and subsequent amendment, the final 
text was passed by an assembly vote on January 27, 2014.144 
Although some have criticized the process as unnecessarily prolonged,145 
NCA members have justified the span of time in terms of the process that it 
followed.146 The Assembly took significant steps to introduce each draft to 
stakeholders in civil society for their input. In the beginning, the constitution-
making process was the all-consuming interest of the Tunisian people. One 
young activist noted, “Before the revolution, café conversations centered around 
TV shows and football. For months after the revolution it was all politics–you 
couldn’t escape it. But the excitement didn’t last–of course there was a lot of 
discussion, but the process took so long that it inevitably led to a degree of 
apathy if not exasperation.”147 
As much as possible, debates were also carried out in full transparency. The 
plenary sessions were formally open to the public,148 and each constitutional 
draft was subject to public consultation and over two thousand town hall 
meetings. 149 While drafting committees invited local experts to contribute to 
each issue of discussion, each discussion was followed by a release of compiled 
notes and proposed amendments and made available to the public on the 
assembly’s website.150 Individual members of the assembly coordinated tours of 
cities and universities around Tunisia to discuss the process and obtain 
feedback.151  Professor Salsabil Klibi, professor at La Faculté des Sciences 
Juridiques stated: “Overall people put a lot of thought into the drafting process. 
Though there were some problems, it was overall very complete.”152 One 
academic at La Faculté de Sciences Juridiques was impressed with the constant 
transfer of information, updates on the drafting process, and the ease of 
navigation of the assembly’s website. The level of accessibility, however, 
seemed to differ between the capital and more remote areas: “We weren’t able 
to get a lot of participation from people in the southwest and the interior. There 
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were efforts to engage with them, but it was for obvious reasons more 
difficult.”153 
The extent to which women in Tunisia proactively engaged in the 
constitution-making process was unprecedented. Drafting safeguards for gender 
equality in all circumstances became the rallying point for women on both ends 
of the political spectrum.154 According to Hela Hammi, a deputy in Ennahda, 
“there [were] a lot of political tensions among members of Parliament, but the 
women worked more or less in tandem.”155 At the early stages of constitution 
drafting, one of the members of Parliament organized a lunchtime meeting for 
all of the female members to sit down and discuss what they perceived as 
primary issues.156 Follow up discussions resulted, during which women deputies 
wrote down their common concerns and proposals, which they then presented to 
the greater assembly.157 A part of this process included transnational experts 
from other countries, such as South Africa, who spoke to them about the role of 
women in their own countries’ drafting process.158 
Outside the political sphere, women were likewise eager to form broad 
rights-based coalitions, particularly those who were already members of a larger 
associational networks. For example, UGTT women leaders at the local and 
regional level provided significant support to other newer women’s rights 
efforts.159 These leaders leveraged the UGTT’s broad membership network to 
push forward initiatives favorable to working class women and their social and 
economic interests.160 Similarly, the ATFD was instrumental in bringing 
together a cross-section of women’s organizations to push through revisions for 
certain provisions including Article 21 on gender equality161, Article 34 on 
political representation162, and Article 46163 on protections for women against all 
forms of violence.164 The association’s galvanizing efforts during the drafting 
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process has allowed it to continue as a key actor in creating implementing 
legislation to turn these guarantees into a reality.165 “We rely heavily on the 
advice of experts and academics,” says ATFD’s current president Saida Rached, 
emphasizing the importance of the association’s network in carrying out its 
work. Having a pulse on all gender-related matters is also critical: “Our current 
focus has been on political participation and gathering information about women 
and rural labor, but we try to focus on all issues related to gender equality.”166 
Yet coalitions by their very nature are prone to ideological and political 
divides. In spite of the UGTT’s efforts to remain neutral, its continuous 
involvement in politics at the national level inevitably made it susceptible to 
political influences. Despite laudable movements early on, internal divisions 
eventually emerged between local members and their national leadership over 
the role UGTT should play moving forward.167 Some feared that the national 
board, based in Tunis, had spent too much time accommodating political elites 
and their business allies at the expense of advocating for greater employee’s 
rights.168 There were also rumors of conflict between UGTT and other well-
established organizations such as LTDH and the Bar Association. Although 
ATFD’s internal divisions have not been as public, it too has received criticism 
for being either too unwieldy or else too tied up in tackling certain ‘elite 
feminist’ issues at the expense of issues facing the rural poor and middle class.169 
Such divides within and among civil society groups inevitably hurt the ability of 
women’s rights coalitions to achieve the aims they seek. 
The UGTT and AFTD are among a handful of nationally recognized civil 
society organizations in Tunisia that existed long before the revolution started. 
While these groups were perhaps the most visible during the early stages of the 
drafting process, a number of newer, youth-led organizations joined the 
associative landscape to become effective mobilizers in their own right. These 
organizations largely emerged as civil society watchdogs over the country’s 
transition to a democratic state. Most notably, Al-Bawsala, a monitoring body 
made up of young Tunisian activists and journalists, was one of the first 
organizations to receive significant attention early on as a key player in 
monitoring Tunisia’s constitution-making process and thereafter movements in 
the national assembly regarding new policies and budget allocation.170 Al-
Bawsala, which means “compass,” has become a distributor of information that 
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other civil society groups and grassroots movements have used to launch 
parallel advocacy efforts.171 
Civil society’s overall ability to influence the drafting process still largely 
hinged on the strength of the relationships between the various demographics 
within civil society and those in Tunisia’s inner political sphere. Though the 
NCA was diligent about setting up websites with recordings of the debates, and 
some deputies went so far as to organize village discussions, the effects of these 
efforts varied. Many individuals, particularly youth, were disenchanted by the 
process.172 One student from Thala173 felt that watching the debates only 
contributed to his discontent and apathy: “It was too much politicking. It was 
often frustrating to watch.”174 Others have noted that the effort to create 
transparency through online streaming spurred conversation. “There are nightly 
debates among commentators now,” noted one civil society volunteer from Sidi 
Bouzid. “Newspapers still have their own political affiliations, but the 
discussion on social media now is much more open and nuanced. Before there 
was one paper and one TV show. It is so diverse now.”175 Even those frustrated 
by the way in which the NCA structured the constitution-making process cannot 
deny the role social media played in introducing a wide representation of views 
on what the constitution’s rights provisions should be and how they should be 
enforced.  Online chat forums provide young women and men, especially those 
outside the capital, with a means for indirect participating in definitions of 
“equality” and the role of women in society.176 
Despite a relatively participatory process, the sentiment among Tunisians 
regarding the final text is mixed – many approve of the 2014 constitution but are 
concerned about its implementation.177 A broad constituency of political activists 
and civil society organizations (CSOs) supported by technical advisors is 
necessary to help keep gender equality at the center of the new constitution, 
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through a policy framework and an agenda for action. Neila Chabaâne, the 
former Minister of Women’s Affairs, has said that young Tunisian women, in 
particular, seem at a loss as to how to apply the constitution’s ideological 
provisions to realities on the ground.178 Though participation was relatively high 
during the drafting process, civil society’s ability to participate in implementing 
constitutional provisions remains an open question. Further, there is a fear that 
certain groups, particularly reintegrated old regime elites, will dominate the 
discussion to the exclusion of others.179 
B. Drafting Gender Sensitive Provisions in the Constitution 
Although the NCA conceived of the drafting of gender rights provisions as 
an organized, transparent, dialogical process between assembly members and 
civil society, the process became one much less formal and direct than designed. 
The NCA tasked the Committee of Human Rights and Liberties, one of six 
drafting committees, with shaping all rights provisions based on civil society 
and foreign recommendations. As such, the committee was responsible for all 
provisions that directly and indirectly touched on gender rights. Express 
guarantees for women are included in Article 21 on gender equality, Article 34 
on political guarantees for women, and Article 46 protecting women against all 
forms of violence.180 Article 39 on the right to public education, Article 44 on 
the right to water, and Article 40 on the right to work, are programmatic rights 
that indirectly address a woman’s right to accessing basic human services.181 The 
express women’s rights provisions will be considered in this section and the 
next, and a discussion of the Constitution’s programmatic rights as they relate to 
women will follow. 
Throughout the drafting process, the Committee of Human Rights and 
Liberties sought input from civil society representatives and relevant experts, as 
well as women deputies within the NCA.182 Women deputies gathered together 
early in the process for discussion lunches, where they would also invite those 
from outside the political sphere.183 Despite this engagement, Salsabil Klibi 
notes, “There could have been more time for collaboration. There were a few 
‘open days’ where civil society organizations were invited to meet with drafters 
at the assembly building, but the time was narrow.”184 There was in fact only one 
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open day for CSOs to speak directly with NCA members, held before the release 
of the second draft.185 Some have suggested that invitations were limited to 
CSOs already involved in the process and that, further, the assembly did not 
have a channel for individuals or informal groups to submit draft proposals. A 
number of those invited boycotted the open day in protest of its timing and 
exclusivity.186 
Regardless of whether the NCA took sufficient steps to formally include 
civil society, many Tunisians informally engaged with the constitution-making 
process through social media, the press, and local politics.187 The extent to which 
Tunisia’s constitution would guarantee women’s rights was one of the most 
widely debated issues outside the political sphere. One journalist described the 
early drafting stages as a “national hunger” to participate in a popular debate 
that had been silenced under Ben Ali.188 State feminism starting with Bourguiba 
through Ben Ali had succeeded in suppressing popular debates over the 
appropriate role of women in Tunisian society and relevant legal protections.189 
Dictated policies of progressive feminism had created the false narrative that 
women in Tunisia enjoyed equal rights with men and that the country had made 
important advances compared to women in other parts of the Arab and Muslim 
world.190 The 2011 Revolution unveiled a complex reality incongruent with 
rights formally recognized by the prior regime.191 This disconnect, exacerbated 
by deep ideological divides in the Tunisian political scene, complicated 
discussions over whether the new constitution’s proper role should be to push 
for universal gender norms or norms that reflect a competing type of feminism 
“emphasizing religious freedoms and rights.”192 Unfortunately, the final draft 
does not necessarily bring this debate to a clear resolution. Article 21 champions 
gender equality in broad and general terms: men and women have “equal rights 
and duties” and are “equal before the law” but the text fails to reach greater 
specificity.193 
The generality of the language in Article 21 is a product, first, of the lack of 
transparency between the NCA and civil society stakeholders, and second, of the 
prolonged popular disputes that came to define much of the constitution-making 
process for provisions related to women’s rights. When the NCA released its 
first draft on August 8, 2012, the article (then Article 28) included 
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complementarity (mutakamila) language as opposed to the equality (musawa) 
language proposed by Nidaa-Tounis and left-leaning CSOs. Those internal to 
the process described the insertion of complementarity as a soft proposal by one 
of the members of Ennahda.194 Some deputies insisted that the language issued 
in the first draft was either a “naïve misstep”195 resulting from a rushed drafting 
process or a mistranslation taken out of context.196 The opposition nevertheless 
contended that even the suggestion of complementary status posed a threat to 
freedoms formally secured in the CSP and joined hands with CSOs to change 
the language to equality (musawa).197 As a part of their campaign, activists 
upheld the CSP as precedent that could not be reversed. The march onto 
Bourguiba Street on Tunisian Women’s Day was in fact a nod to Bourguiba 
himself, who established the holiday to commemorate the CSP and its 
advancements.198 Although his efforts were influenced primarily by his desire to 
gain international favor among Western powers, women’s rights activists have 
nevertheless heralded the CSP for both its significance and ongoing influence.199 
The selective referencing of Tunisia’s past in order to legitimize certain 
values over others became part of a larger popular struggle to control not only 
the language of the constitution, but also the political narrative surrounding it.200 
Pro-Bourguiba rhetoric was perhaps more a reflection of popular conceptions of 
women’s rights during the drafting process than an accurate understanding of 
women’s rights as applied under the Bourguiba regime. Many individuals who 
participated in the August 13 march on Bourguiba Street did not in fact 
champion Bourguiba or his policies, but rather represented a mix of political and 
religious viewpoints. As Hadia Bilhajj, CAWTAR Director stated, “[i]t wasn’t 
one strand of civil society or one opposition party. There were men and women, 
a diverse range of NGOs and other civil society organizations – not just secular 
groups pushing a certain narrative of women’s rights.”201 Likewise, though the 
complementary language proposal came from members of Ennahda, not all 
Ennahda members were in support. Regarding the initial proposal, Hela Hammi 
member of the Ennahda party, commented: “We knew from the beginning that 
complementarity language would be abused in Tunisia. France has 
complementarity language but the text in its constitution implies that there is 
submission on both sides – there was a valid fear that men in Tunisia would 
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interpret complementarity to mean only the submission of women.”202 
Nevertheless, some secularist feminist discourses sought to paint Ennahda with 
one brush as a misogynist party with patriarchal motivations.203 To that effect, 
these groups released speculative and unofficial versions of the drafted provision 
before the August 13 march to garner greater opposition to Ennahda control.204 
Ennahda then responded by launching a counter campaign and march on August 
13, also on Bourguiba Street, that highlighted positive statements made by the 
then President Rachid Ghannouchi. Though activists eventually succeeded in 
removing complementary language from the final draft, it is evident that control 
over the text’s “legislative history” became as important to the debate as the text 
itself. 
Similar to its efforts surrounding Article 21, elements of civil society 
pushed for more actionable language under Article 46. The Article states that 
“[t]he State shall commit to protecting women’s achieved rights and seek to 
support and develop them.”205  In addition, it reaffirms equal opportunity 
between men and women in “all various responsibilities in all fields,” and 
guarantees that the state “will take necessary measures to eliminate violence 
against women.”206 Secular groups feared that without this provision and its 
enforcement clause, Islamists would alter, if not remove the CSP as source of 
law. However, Ennahda’s ultimate support for the addition during the final vote 
in January 2014 seems to convey the party leadership’s intent to at least 
maintain protections provided under the CSP. 
Ennahda’s leadership in bringing about the final versions of Articles 21 and 
46 should not go without mention. Achieving a guarantee of gender equality, 
without exceptions, was among the most heralded accomplishments of the final 
text. A large part of the battle for Ennahda as the controlling party was to 
overcome disagreements and possible misunderstandings to reach a general 
spirit of collaboration. The multiplication of civil society interests in 2011 and 
onward meant that consensus on all sides would be crucial to passing a women’s 
rights provision championing equality and parity. “Under the Ennahda 
government, Islamists opened a new path for women’s rights,” says Dr. Khedija 
Arfaoui from University of Tunis.207 
While Dr. Arfaoui’s statement is put to question in the next section, 
Ennahda, for all of its faults, led a constitution-making process marked by 
greater consensus and public input than that of other transition states in the 
region. Egypt’s drafting process in 2012 offers the most relevant comparison. 
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While both Ennahda and its ruling counterpart in Egypt, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, had to reconcile Islamist interests and the interests of secular or 
left-leaning parties, the process in Egypt suffered from relative lack of public 
participation and input.208 Egypt’s 2012 Constitution reflected more of a political 
compromise among parties than a response to calls from women’s rights 
advocates. While the text outlawed violence against women, including the 
practice of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), it provided only tepid support for 
other forms of women’s rights.209 It has in effect taken a step back from some of 
the gender rights embedded in the 1971 text. As noted by former Egyptian 
Minister Moushira Khattab, the new Egyptian Constitution places “women 
under the constitutional chapter on moral foundations instead of rights and 
freedoms.”210  In terms of political participation rights, the 2014 Constitution 
does not include the 64-seat quota established in 1971 and merely promises to 
take measures to guarantee women “appropriate representation” in elected 
councils.211 
Analysts have considered several theories as to why the drafting processes 
in Egypt and Tunisia brought forth such divergent results, particularly given that 
both constitutions were produced by an elected constituent assembly that made 
room for some level of public participation. Some suggest that while Islamists in 
both countries held the most seats in their constituent assemblies, the Muslim 
Brotherhood-affiliated Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) was ultimately much 
less willing to compromise on the gender rights provisions than Tunisia’s 
Ennahda party during drafting negotiations.212 Conversely, Ennahda espoused a 
platform of moderate Islamism that lent itself to concessions early on. There is 
some reason to believe that a simple majority win for the FJP allowed for its 
intransigence, while the Ennahda’s plurality win, though significant, exposed the 
party to strong counter-coalitions.213 Others suggest that the difference was in 
starting points: while Tunisia opted for a blank slate, Egypt worked off of its 
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1971 constitution’s text.214 One factor that deserves greater consideration, 
however, is how Tunisia’s constitution-making framework incorporated 
mechanisms for ongoing public engagement and further, public accountability. 
Participation from outside the political sphere was not restricted to online 
comments or a final up-down referendum vote215—rather, input from watchdog 
organizations and grassroots coalitions became an integral part of the drafting 
process. 
In summary, the drafting process became less about the text itself than 
about surrounding discourses and the competing narratives that shaped women’s 
rights in Tunisia post-revolution. Constitution-making became an opportunity 
for political and civil society stakeholders to address deep-seated issues long 
suppressed under Bourguiba and Ben Ali. Starting with a tabula rasa as opposed 
to an older constitutional text encouraged individuals to assert their personal 
conceptions of women’s rights more vigorously, resulting in greater 
transparency on every side of the debate. Ennahda, though not without its 
weaknesses and challenges, should be commended for its willingness to foster 
such debate and compromise with its more progressive counterparts early on. An 
inability to reach greater consensus, however, has led to a text that supports 
gender equality in broad terms but leaves room for gaps in both enforcement and 
implementation. 
C. Reconciling Islam and Human Rights in the Constitution 
As noted in the previous section, Article 21 guarantees men and women 
“equal rights and duties” and equality “before the law” but fails to reach greater 
specificity or include clear enforcement provisions.216 Critics of Ennahda 
suggest that the ruling party permitted such ambiguity to erode women’s 
rights.217 Others argue that ambiguity was not so much an intentional result as a 
reflection of Ennahda’s internal struggle to place moderate Islamist principles 
within a historically secular framework.218 Regardless of its intended purpose, 
however, an ambiguous provision on gender equality would have perpetuated 
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the struggle to constitutionally define the role of women in Tunisia, as well as 
conflicting de jure and de facto realities. 
This tension between what is law and what is practiced is particularly 
visible with the hijab. Prior to the revolution, women were banned from wearing 
the hijab or headscarves in all state institutions including universities, hospitals, 
and public administrations. Thus, many women after the revolution asserted 
their right to independent expression by wearing the hijab or niqab. Some 
Ennahda members went so far as to endorse student protests at Manouba 
University, among others,219 that called for the right to wear a hijab or niqab in 
all public settings. Conversely, women who did not cover their face or hair 
feared that though Ennahda’s leadership championed women’s rights and 
freedom of expression in broad terms, its policy while in power would be to 
shift towards enforcing such freedoms selectively.220 Indeed, Arfaoui notes that 
the revolution sparked for the first time in Tunisia’s history “a wave of abuses of 
women without a covering” that then fueled not only a general sense of 
insecurity, but also a greater concern that if Ennahda did not impose its religious 
preferences by law, it would find opportunities to permit imposition by popular 
might.221 
A journalist and young Tunisian women’s rights activist notes that 
inconsistencies between what is law and what is practiced will persist if rights 
are only acknowledged in the text and not more: “Tunisia fascinates people 
because it is a paradox when it comes to gender equality. And it has always been 
this way.”222 Some attribute this to ambiguities in Tunisia’s constitution citing to 
Islam and its role in Tunisia’s political system and culture. One scholar has 
noted that when Bourguiba gave credence to women’s rights under the CSP, he 
was “careful to locate these changes . . . within the framework, not of dismissing 
religion, but of a modernist reading of Islam.”223 By contrast, the constitution of 
1959 recognizes Islam as the official religion of Tunisia, but does not constrict 
Islam to any one practice or interpretation.224 Neither text, in effect, fully 
reconciles Islam with more ‘modern’ societal values. Hadia Bilhajj emphasizes 
the importance of acknowledging Tunisia’s Islamic heritage as significant, while 
also acknowledging the tension it creates with modernist notions of human 
rights: “Tunisia, like its neighbors Algeria and Morocco, must work in 
contradictions. It is an Arab, Islamic state subject to a long period of colonial 
occupation. Some think this has to be a decision between secularism and 
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Islamism, but our situation is much more complex than that.”225 A tendency to 
oversimplify views of Islam and women’s rights in Tunisia is perhaps a product 
of top-down policies under Bourguiba that then carried over to Ben Ali: “[Ben 
Ali] manipulated women’s rights as a tool to accrue international favor, with 
little if any internal application,” says Hadia Bilhajj, “All women’s associations 
at that time were headed by Ben Ali’s wife, who propped up Tunisia as a false 
paragon of women’s rights.”226 Such obvious statism created some semblance of 
a women’s national machinery that formally aligned with UN mandates and 
acquired praise from the international community but had little impact on the 
actual status of Tunisian women. To ensure a uniformly progressive image of 
women’s rights, alternative viewpoints were either watered down or heavily 
suppressed. 
The constitution-making process was thus driven by a desire to replace a 
state-defined culture of rights with a text reflecting broad consensus between 
“values of Islam and values of modernity.”227 NCA members sought to create a 
constitution that would satisfy and respect all visions of women’s rights in 
Tunisian society. What resulted, however, was a patchwork of provisions that 
fail to fully reconcile all stakeholders’ interests. Most notably, the Tunisian 
constitution’s preamble expresses both a “commitment to teachings of Islam” 
and to “the principals of universal human rights,” without clarifying the nature 
of the relationship between these two sources.228 Although these commitments 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive, there is significant confusion over how 
they should be considered, independently and collectively, during the early 
phases of implementation.  Similar confusion emerges when we look at Article 1 
and its assertion that “Tunisia is a free. . .sovereign state” and “Islam is its 
religion,” compared to the assertion in Article 2 that the state is based on “the 
will of the people, and the supremacy of law.”229 In regards to “Islam is its 
religion,” it is not clear to what “it” refers. Is “it” Tunisia as a society, or the 
political nature of its government? If the intent is the latter, then Article 2 
declaring Tunisia as a “civil state” creates a contradiction that the constitutional 
court, once established, must address. This contradiction is exacerbated by the 
last sentence in Article 1 stating, “this article cannot be amended,” and Article 
146, which requires that “the Constitution’s provisions shall be interpreted as a 
harmonious whole.”230 
Even within Ennahda there was much debate during the drafting process 
over the interpretation of Islamic texts and their various applications to Tunisian 
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law. One of the party’s greatest challenges was—and still is—to define women’s 
rights within an Islamic framework.231 While Ennahda held itself out as a 
moderate Islamist coalition resting on a unified platform, its members and 
supporters represented a broad spectrum of perspectives on the rights of 
women.232 This led to disagreements around what the scope and definition of the 
rights of women should be at the constitutional level. Conservative streams 
pushed for clear, separated gender roles in line with individual interpretations of 
sharia law, in some cases including a return to polygamy or a repeal of national 
abortion laws.233 Hela Hammi, a deputy of Ennahda in the current government, 
remarked that her “feminist beliefs” are not universally encouraged by her 
colleagues, and that differences stem from cultural, not religious stigmas: “There 
is a societal norm in Tunisia that men come home and read the paper and 
women cook, clean, and take care of the home – there is nothing in the Qur’an 
or in the Sunna delegating these roles.”234 During the drafting process she 
pushed conservative members to scrutinize Tunisia’s patriarchal structures as 
independent from values of Islam and not to be tolerated, let alone validated, by 
the country’s future legal system. 
In the discourse over women’s rights and Islam there is no single, uniform 
perspective.235 The revolution, its aftermath, and the constitution-making process 
reveal divergent views extant within Tunisia’s Muslim community about the 
role of women in Tunisian society. A cross-cultural dialogue between the 
Islamic community and the international human rights community is important 
for a shared basis for human rights and towards advancing the legitimacy of 
universal human rights norms to local communities that are defined by religious 
affiliation. Religious communities in Tunisia are internally contested, 
heterogeneous, and constantly evolving through internal debate and interaction, 
and women are demanding change within their religious communities in order to 
bring their faith in line with democratic norms and practices.236 Cross-cultural, 
cross-gender, and cross-class dialogue is critical to resolving conflicts within 
Islam as well as between Islam and human rights. Such dialogue also triggers 
discussions on controversial issues implicating Islamic values and human rights 
norms and dispels notions that there is one absolute or final notion of Islam or 
that any one person can claim to have the one true teaching. This allows women 
activists to articulate a Muslim feminist jurisprudential basis that is consistent 
with gender equality. 
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Ennahda, within the political sphere, has appropriated a modern face of 
Islam but continues to struggle internally in defining what this stance will 
entail.237 Apart from Ennahda is the rise of Salafist groups, both quietist—those 
who do not participate in politics or warfare—and activist, with each faction 
holding to a different vision of gender roles in Tunisian society.238 Men and 
women alike vigorously defend these groups. In fact, there are indications in 
recent years that women, particularly those who come from impoverished 
circumstances or have been underserved by the state, have been drawn to these 
groups’ ideologies and practices as an alternate form of security.239  Going 
forward, the role of Salafism in Tunisian society cannot be ignored and requires 
further attention. 
D. Freedom from Violence as a Constitutional Right 
The remainder of this section will take a look at how a guarantee of gender 
equality in the constitution applies to other guarantees for women, namely, 
protection against violence, political guarantees, and programmatic rights. The 
Tunisian Constitution under Article 46 outlaws violence against women and 
assures that “the State shall take the necessary measures to eradicate violence 
against women.”240  Although Article 46 recognizes national security not just in 
the context of border security and armed forces, but also as security at home and 
in the streets, inconsistencies in the law prevent the state from further 
considering the latter. 
Several existing national laws are in indirect conflict with the new 
constitution’s commitment to end violence against women in all its forms. For 
example, men are legally recognized as the head of the household, which as one 
Tunisian analyst noted “only works to reinforce economic and social patriarchal 
structures.”241 Civil society groups are also urging for changes to the penal code, 
which, similar to laws in other Arab countries, does not explicitly acknowledge 
marital rape and grants a man convicted with rape the option to marry his victim 
with the benefit of dropping charges.242 In terms of economic violence, labor 
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laws make room for gender wage disparity and have historically failed to protect 
female agricultural workers from substandard working conditions and abusive 
contractual relationships.243 The Secretary of State for Women Affairs is 
collaborating with NGOs to harmonize the existing legal framework with 
constitutional provisions, but such efforts will need cross-sector and horizontal 
support across ministries to be effective. 
To date the law on violence against women remains a draft law. Though 
still in draft form, many seem hopeful that the law will pass. “Civil society 
efforts and support from international organizations are strong,” says Neila 
Chaâbane, one of the key drafters of the law during her time as Minister of 
Women.244 A national survey conducted in 2010 showed that 47 percent of 
women in Tunisia had faced at least one form of violence, a daunting number 
given that women make up 52 percent of the population.245 Yet, increasing 
extremist violence, such as the attack on the Badaro Museum, the resort attack 
in Sousse, and the bus bombing in central Tunis, has turned the focus away from 
social forms of violence towards greater security in the militaristic or police 
force sense.246 A greater police presence to “fight terrorism” does not in any way 
guarantee a decrease in sexual or physical violence against women. Unearthed 
accounts of police violence against women under Ben Ali as well as numerous 
cases of rape by police during the protests in 2011 are further evidence of this.247 
Efforts to draft an anti-violence against women law were present even 
before the revolution. “It was one of the issues that the Ben Ali regime 
selectively chose to support.”248 The draft law, however, is an effort to create a 
legal framework that is comprehensive.249 It addresses all forms of violence, 
including physical, psychological, economic, and inter-family.250 Some of its 
provisions include a formalized framework for victims to prosecute perpetrators 
and state protection for those who seek justice.251 Efforts such as the 
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establishment of victim shelters and a stable, advertised hotline will be expanded 
and supported by the state.252 “The biggest challenge has been to convince 
certain members of society, of the assembly, that this issue is relevant,” notes 
Chaâbane. “Unfortunately, public officials at the top are removed and thus 
create a lot of push back. But judges in penal courts recognize this law as 
necessary.”253 
Lobbying efforts have sought to reframe violence against women as an 
economic cost in order to appeal to parties who would normally not lend 
support.254 Studies guided by the Ministry of Women have quantified the 
negative impact of violence in terms of a woman’s ability to enter the labor 
force and be an active participant in family and society.255 Groups actively 
involved in the passage of the law are concerned, however, that civil society 
initiatives are fractured and not unified.256 Some feel that while the law provides 
access to justice for survivors of violence and free access to medical care for 
victims, it does not go far enough in providing shelters and legal aid.257 On the 
other hand, Tunisia’s willingness to define domestic violence as a public crime 
and enshrine it in the supreme law of the land sends an important message both 
nationally and globally. Moreover, the Tunisian provision defines domestic 
violence against a woman as a crime against the personal security of the 
woman.258 
E. Political Rights 
Another focus has been on fixing parliamentary and election laws, with a 
particular emphasis on increasing women’s participation at the local level. Well-
established civil society groups are involved in reforming the electoral law to 
mandate horizontal as well as vertical parity. The ATFD and groups like League 
of Tunisian Women Voters (LET) are particularly concerned with how parity 
laws steer political elections, arguing that what is currently in place is either 
ineffective or does not go far enough.259 Both Articles 34 and 46 in the 
constitution provide certain political guarantees for women, including quotas in 
government offices.260 While Article 34 upholds a general commitment to 
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guarantee women representation in elected councils, Article 46 specifically 
creates a state obligation to achieve gender parity, creating a strong 
constitutional foundation for legislation to increase women’s political 
participation at the national, regional and local levels.261 
In an attempt to embody political gender equality in principle, elections 
lists during the 2011 election of the constituent assembly were “vertically 
zippered” such that every second candidate on each list was supposed to be a 
woman.262 Some hailed this rule as a good first step: women composed over 25 
percent (57 out of 217 seats) of the national assembly post-2011 and in the 2014 
elections, which mandated similar rules, women voter turnout was marginally 
higher than that in 2011, even while the youth turnout took a significant dive.263 
Yet, some women’s activists argue these rules do not fully embrace the 
guarantees provided in the constitution, noting that many of the women elected 
were already plugged into the political system or else used as spot-fillers with 
little opportunity to contribute as representatives of their electors.264 
Furthermore, male candidates headed the vast majority of the lists submitted. 
Critics of the current election rules have thus made a push for horizontal 
zippering on top of vertical zippering in the next election.265 Critics also believe 
that in order to increase public support given to women who seek political 
office, there must be greater solidarity among women in local municipalities and 
heightened political awareness among young women nationally.266  
F. Programmatic Rights in the Tunisian Constitution: 
The Tunisian Constitution enshrines both negative and positive rights, or 
civil and political and economic and social rights. Economic and social rights, or 
programmatic rights, are sometimes referred to as second-generation rights that 
demand additional resources for the fulfillment of these rights. Constitutions are 
no longer limited to restraining the exercise of power; they deal with the 
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redistribution of power. While negative rights curtail the power of government, 
prohibiting or limiting the exercise of governmental power, positive or 
programmatic rights call upon the government to provide resources, services, 
and programs for their fulfillment.  Substantive rights encompass positive 
programs to fulfill those rights and address inequality. However, without 
mechanisms and procedures for the actualization of these rights, they remain 
largely limited to the realm of rhetoric. In 2004, when National Women 
Outreach on Constitutional Reform in Nigeria made a set of recommendations to 
make the constitution more women-friendly, it called for the justiciability of 
current constitutional socio-economic rights. 
Tunisia is a party to the ICESCR, and the Tunisian Constitution has 
included social and economic rights in the Constitution.267 These rights include 
the right to health, right to water, and right to education.268 These programmatic 
rights, although inextricably linked to civil and political rights, are not directly 
enforceable in the way civil and political rights are, but must await 
implementation through legislative or executive action and through budgetary 
appropriations. 
Social guarantees with respect to matters such as education can be defined 
as women’s rights. Article 44(1) of the Sudanese Constitution asserts that 
“[e]ducation is a right for every citizen and that the State shall provide access to 
education without discrimination as to . . . gender  . . .” Alternatively, Article 39 
of the Tunisian Constitution mandates education until the age of sixteen and 
makes free public education a right “at all stages,” but does not specify 
gender.269 This provision, if implemented properly, can have a powerful impact 
on young women and can help combat early marriage. Mandating education for 
all children, including the girl child, can be a powerful vaccine against early 
marriage and is a cardinal and non-negotiable human right for girls and women. 
Article 44 of Tunisia’s constitution similarly guarantees the right to water 
and is one of the first constitutions in the world to do so.270 Article 44 further 
requires the state to implement government policies that promote conservation 
and rational use in order to protect this right.271 This is especially important for 
marginalized women in rural areas or women laborers in the agricultural sector. 
Recent water shortages have sparked debate over exactly how this right can be 
implemented, such that rational use also results in equal distribution.272 
Proposals include convertible energy initiatives, alternative methods of farming, 
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and new irrigation techniques, but their relation to matters such as labor 
conditions for women is unclear.273 
Article 40 in Tunisia’s constitution stipulates that “[w]ork is a right for 
every citizen, male and female alike” and gives all citizens “the right to adequate 
working conditions and a fair wage,” but does not go further.274 Yet, the political 
discourse on rights implementation does not, as of yet, incorporate a gendered 
perspective. One reporter and human rights activist notes that outside of political 
forums, “[P]eople do not even discuss economic issues in terms of the 
constitution, at least not how to connect women’s rights with economic rights. It 
is merely aspirational at this point.”275 For example, while the UGTT has been a 
major supporter for raising the overall minimum wage, it has not placed much 
emphasis on wage gender disparity.276 
PART III 
The extent to which the constitution-making process in Tunisia drew on 
international influences is unclear. Unlike in countries like South Africa or 
Sudan, the NCA in Tunisia never clearly manifested its intent to incorporate 
aspects of international law into its constitutional text.277 Inconsistencies 
between state practices at the international level verses national and subnational 
levels further question the relevance of international law in Tunisia’s transition 
efforts moving forward. Transnational entities did work closely with local CSOs 
as advisors, monitors, and co-coordinators and provided significant funding to 
various CSO initiatives. This first section of Part III will take a brief look at 
some of the discrepancies between relevant international agreements and the 
priority given to international law in relation to Tunisia’s new constitution and 
national legislation. The section thereafter will look at the interaction between 
Tunisian civil society and visible international actors. Our conclusion is that 
while the rights provisions in Tunisia’s constitution do not fully incorporate 
standards of international law, those provisions can be seen as “intermestic” in 
the sense that they are the product of softer modes of international influence, 
predominantly the role of international actors in promoting liberal notions of 
human rights within Tunisia’s civil society. 
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A. Supremacy of International Law 
Tunisia has signed and ratified human rights treaties CEDAW (1985),278 
ICCPR (1969),279 and ICESCR (1969).280 It officially removed reservations “not 
in conflict with provisions in Chapter I of the Tunisian Constitution” in 2014.281 
While Tunisia’s new constitution does not expressly incorporate provisions from 
these texts, international observers have recognized a general incorporation of 
international standards for women’s rights under customary international law.282 
There is some ambiguity, however, regarding the relationship between 
international law and national law, particularly in the context of judicial 
interpretation. Article 20 of the Tunisian Constitution gives primacy to 
“international agreements approved and ratified by the Chamber of the People’s 
Deputies” over national laws but will remain “inferior to the Constitution.”283 
International observers as well as organizations like the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) have questioned this ordering of laws, pointing to other models that 
maintain international law as supreme.284 Members of the constitutive committee 
responsible for drafting Article 20 explain, however, that the intent was not to 
undermine Tunisia’s international obligations, but to allow for the use of 
international laws as interpretive tools in clarifying ambiguities in the national 
laws, especially in relation to women’s rights.285 
The constitutionalization of international agreements as supreme over 
Tunisia’s national laws is significant. However, there are ways the state can 
limit, if not make obsolete, the relevance of international law at the national 
level. Tunisia’s repeal of all reservations under CEDAW is a good example of 
this. In April 2014 Tunisia released a general statement committing itself to the 
elimination of all forms of discrimination against women and withdrew all 
reservations it submitted when it signed the CEDAW.286 Though lauded as a 
move toward greater international accountability for gender equality, Tunisia 
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maintains that it will not make legislative decisions that contradict Chapter I of 
the Constitution.287 This leaves open the question of how Tunisia will balance 
cultural practices with international standards. 
B. The Role of International Actors in Constitution-Making 
“International organizations have been working with us closely – it is a 
good dynamic and we like that they are wanting to be involved,” says Saida 
Rached.288 Notable international supporters included UN agencies like UN 
Development Programme (UNDP), which helped bring politicians and 
representatives from other countries to speak to the assembly.289 The British 
Embassy was likewise supportive by inviting members to hear from and consult 
with foreign analysis.290 The Venice Commission also coordinated international 
experts with Tunisian politicians to present “foundational best practices” and 
facilitated brainstorming among local NGOs.291 
Countries that sent democracy experts included the US, France, Canada, 
Belgium, Spain, and Poland.292 Interviewees also noted significant participation 
of former Soviet and Sub-Saharan states. Both regions seemed eager to share 
insights, given their recent drafting experiences and ongoing transition efforts. 
Many echoed a sentiment that there was at most “influential pressure- we felt 
their opinions were important, and they let us know when we were on the ‘right 
track’, or how we could make the drafting process more effective. There was no 
sense that they were imposing their ideas on us.”293 A healthy level of skepticism 
seems to color remarks towards the international presence in Tunisia, but no one 
has yet expressed frustration that ideas were imposed or entirely irrelevant.294 
Others have suggested that some international organizations were less 
imposing than others. Salsabil Klibi argues that, “Yes there were and are 
concerns about an international takeover, direct or indirect. But I would say that 
final decisions, the final document was left to Tunisians.”295 On the other hand, 
there are several reports that frame the process as a period of excitement 
followed by disillusionment, spurred in part by a “deluge” of international 
interests that did not translate into true expertise.296 International organizations, 
rather, came with a set of pre-packaged provisions not molded to the social or 
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political context. Some interviewees suggested that the priorities of international 
organizations were misaligned with priorities of Tunisians.297 Foreign 
development groups such as USAID overemphasized the fostering of 
ideological values such as democratic awareness and gender equality at the 
expense of substantive, arguably more critical issues related to youth 
unemployment, openness in the media, and economic stability.298 There was 
concurrently a tendency to generalize Tunisia’s situation with that of Egypt and 
Libya: “Tunisians do not universally align themselves with other North-African 
states,” remarked one activist. “Some are more francophonized, others connect 
with countries like Morocco and Algeria, and still others just see our country as 
unique unto itself.”299 
“International support is very important, but what is more important is 
developing a power structure that connects regions within Tunisia. UGTT is less 
involved with what is happening internationally and more engaged with local 
interests,” said Habiba Mizoumi, National Secretary General for Dentists & 
Nurses for the UGTT.300 Indeed, decades of political and economic repression of 
Tunisia’s southern interior under both the Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes 
created high disparity between this region and Tunisia’s coastal regions.301 Thus, 
other individuals, like Habiba, have felt that establishing local autonomy and 
strengthening channels of interregional communication will be of greater 
significance in determining Tunisia’s future than in establishing relationships 
with international forces. 
Young civil society organizations (CSOs) in particular have been willing to 
work with international funders as a way to jump-start their initiatives. Hadia 
Bilhajj, director at CAWTAR stated, “we can’t shut the door on the international 
community. It plays a necessary role in financing and investing in our broken 
economy. But Tunisians are certainly skeptical of whether the interests of the 
international community are truly aligned with their own. So we take a risk, out 
of necessity.”302 Souhayel Hedfi from Jam3ity—a civil society organization 
aggregator and networking platform—sees his relationship with foreign funders 
as more of a mutually beneficial learning experience: 
“Some funders still want to contribute to human rights and 
democratization exclusively. We wanted that in the beginning, but now 
the situation is different. Many NGOs in the southern interior for 
example are now focused on environmental or infrastructural issues. The 
funders are slow to catch on but they’re receptive to feedback when we 
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tell them the requirements for funding don’t match our interests or what 
we see as priority in our country.”303 
Many international democracy and rule of law organizations limit or 
narrow the reform process to a fight against corruption and the formalization of 
liberalism through free and fair elections, while overlooking the need for 
structural reforms. “Transparency” and “good governance” metrics nested 
within a market model are prioritized over the public protection of individual 
human rights. The key, thus, will be to see if international entities moving 
forward will view their efforts as a collaborative rather than delegated process. 
International support in implementing the rights enshrined in Tunisia’s 
constitution will largely depend on reception of and adaptability to local 
interests. 
PART IV 
A. The Way Ahead: Challenges and Opportunities 
A constitution is both fundamental, and authoritative, but it is also 
dependent on robust institutions for implementation and enforcement, as well as 
legal and political will and a culture of constitutionalism. A critical question 
before the Tunisian framers of the constitution is the question of a normative 
hierarchy in rights. Tunisian civil society is defined by its heterogeneity and its 
goal of translating the constitution into national laws. The passage of the 
constitution from the transitional into the permanent phase requires the 
collaboration of efforts of inter-governmental agencies and the constant 
vigilance of civil society. 
Tunisia can learn from other countries, from both those countries’ 
successes and failures. But there must be a fine balance in place to reach out for 
international assistance where needed without letting international actors hijack 
the reform process altogether. Hailed as a success, the text accomplishes this 
goal. It will be important in this next phase for local processes to continue to 
drive implementation initiatives, albeit with ample access to international 
resources and support. International and foreign actors must likewise support 
local actors in facilitating transparency and open society while maintaining 
respect for local interests. 
In the context of enforcement, quite often gender equality and women’s 
rights can be jettisoned at the altar of competing rights.  The courts must enforce 
gender equality as a non-derogable right that cannot be subordinated by culture 
or religion. Taking into account these concerns among others, this section 
examines the way forward for women in Tunisia and the next steps in the 
Tunisian constitution reform process. 
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B. Advancing a Culture of Constitutional Rights 
Strengthening a culture of constitutional rights involves ensuring that 
institutions are governed according to the constitution and that the independence 
of the judiciary is safeguarded to adjudicate constitutional rights claims and to 
hold state and non-state actors compliant with the constitution. This involves 
providing access to justice and strengthening the rule of law so that all persons, 
including women, can access courts and other adjudicatory mechanisms to 
enforce the constitution and the laws made to implement it.304 Protecting the 
integrity of the constitution involves limiting the erosion of constitutional 
guarantees, and in particular preventing a narrow interpretation of the 
constitution in a way that undermines human rights and women’s human rights 
guarantees. 
While the adoption of the rights and freedoms in the Constitution is 
important, it may be equally important to educate citizens about these rights and 
ways to safeguard them, including how citizens can vindicate their rights in 
courts.305 As set out in Article 102 of the Tunisian Constitution, “The judiciary is 
an independent authority that ensures the prevalence of justice, the supremacy of 
the Constitution, the sovereignty of law, and the protection of rights and 
freedoms.”306 This Article emphasizes that the independence of the judiciary 
from legislative and executive interference is a bedrock principle of the rule of 
law. That is why the constitution-making process does not end at the 
promulgation of the constitution but is a continuing process that sparks the 
development of rights and establishing mechanisms to protect constitutional 
guarantees. 
A culture of constitutionalism must also help to build a strong, integrated 
civil society that has the capacity and motivation to monitor governmental 
institutions. Political transparency during the drafting process must become the 
norm, such that civil society can act as a watchdog and impose accountability on 
state actors without fear of repression. Activists outside the political sphere are 
in the best position to ensure that there is a balance of powers among 
governmental institutions and that those powers are being used in the best 
interests of the people. In Tunisia, many of the youth who participated in the 
2011 protests have turned to civil society groups as a way to stay active in their 
country’s transition towards democracy. Disillusionment with the current 
government is widespread among youth, as exhibited by low voter turnout 
during the last national elections in 2014. Yet, many believe there is still space 
and opportunity to build a civil society platform upon which youth can 
communicate with local politicians and have their voices heard.307 Alia, a young 
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graduate from Thala stated, “many youth have never visited places outside of 
their own region. Civil society organizations have included workshops where 
people from all over Tunisia can meet together and network. It’s a great aspect 
of the education process and only helps our own activism locally.”308 
Similar comments were made during a civil society workshop in the 
northern coastal town of Bizerte. Participants were young activists from various 
municipalities across the country, all of whom were involved and committed to 
building small NGOs in their own communities. Hatem ben Romdhane, the 
leader of an association called Irada (meaning “will” or “desire”) in Djerba 
acquiesced, “there are a lot of internal challenges, but we’re doing our best.”309 
Workshop activities thus centered on networking and lobbying strategies, as 
well as understanding the new government’s constitutional structure. 
Under Ben Ali, all civil society groups were subject to co-optation, 
monitoring, and outright repression.310 Thus, most civil society groups, like 
Irada, are young. Educational opportunities for those involved in such groups 
are frequent. “[It] seems like every month we’re sending at least one 
representative to an event like this,” remarked Hatem.311 
Although many civil society groups acknowledge that the Constitution 
contains strong rights provisions, they are concerned about the gap between 
reality and the text of the document. Many felt driven to civil society because of 
a lack of youth representation in government. “Low youth voter turnout in 2014 
was a reflection of both economic and political frustrations,” commented one 
participant. “For some of my friends it was a decision between going to the 
polling station and going to a football match. And they chose the football 
match!”312 Another participant noted that while the last elections had 
significantly more international observers than in 2011 and a healthy number of 
youth monitors, the problem was less process and more lack of trust: “We are all 
scared of a slide back to tyranny. We are skeptical of whether our government is 
truly democratic but we must continue to push for democratic elections.”313 
It is again instructive to look at other countries to see how constitutional 
provisions can guarantee their own enforcement and implementation. For 
example, the Colombian Constitution of 1991 created a Constitutional Court and 
the tutela, which empowered individuals to bring suits when their constitutional 
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rights have been abridged.314 Litigants have used the new women’s protection 
clauses with success in many cases. Without the tutela and the new 
Constitutional Court, the women’s protection clauses may have been 
meaningless. 
The Tunisian state has institutional responsibility to implement the 
Constitution through enabling legislation and institutions. Implementation of a 
constitution can be predicated upon strengthening or setting up new institutions 
provided for by the constitution, allocating powers and responsibilities, 
jurisdiction, resources (including finances and staff), and monitoring 
mechanisms. At the same time, the state must also stay accountable to civil 
society. The constitution created three ministries of civil society, one under each 
branch of government— executive, parliamentary, and judiciary.315 The strength 
of these ministries relative to others, however, remains to be seen.316 
C. Developing Enabling Legislation 
There continues to be a push to create laws that are not just nominally 
supportive of gender equality, but contain technical safeguards ensuring equality 
in various spheres. Yet, it is too early to predict how the Tunisian National 
Assembly will formulate enabling legislation. There is also uncertainty around 
how the judiciary will go about constitutionality review. The Supreme Judicial 
Council, which is tasked with the responsibility of assembling a constitutional 
court, has been the subject of much controversy. Tension surrounding the 
selection of members delayed its formation, which has inevitably delayed its 
appointment of a new constitutional court, the deadline for which was initially 
set for October 2015.317 The administrative tribunal has been designated as a 
constitutional court and will hold that role until a separate court is formed. 
There is general certainty among judges and legal scholars that before 
assessing constitutionality of laws, the court will have to deal with 
contradictions internal to the constitution itself. “It is too early to project how 
these contradictions will be reconciled, let alone how the constitution will be 
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applied to forthcoming legislation,” noted Jaouahar ben Mubarak, a scholar of 
constitutional law and president of the network Destourna (Our Constitution).318 
President of LET Kelthoum Kennou insists that the Tunisian civil society 
has played a critical role in shaping the constitution and continues to play a 
pivotal role in its enforcement. This was best illustrated, she notes, in the 
allocation of a communication channel by initiating the position of coordinator 
with the civil society not only in the parliament but also in government and in 
the presidency. This channel was particularly effective concerning the 
promulgation of the law of the supreme judicial council: 
Some specialized associations have worked on presenting 
recommendations to the parliament. Some of them also took part in a 
technical committee within the ministry of justice that is granted the 
power to suggest legislations. Other associations not only made 
suggestions but also presented proposal provisions to deputies for 
adoption in the parliamentary committee. This was an initiative of the 
League of Tunisian Women Voters (LET), which, as a part of its mission, 
focuses its project on the presence of women judges as decision makers 
in this council.319 
One of the major impediments to implementing the constitutional 
guarantees is budgetary constraints. Our interview with Hadia Bilhajj revealed 
that there are currently no funds for women’s empowerment efforts, and that 
even if there is in the short-term, it will likely come in the form of conditional 
international aid. Resolving Tunisia’s debt and revamping the economy has 
taken precedent, though this does not seem unique to women’s rights: “We 
aren’t able to deal with things in parallel. We focus on one issue and ignore the 
others.”320 One assembly member has noted that the strategy thus far has been 
not so much to fight for a percentage of the budget, but to show how improving 
the status of women will have positive economic ramifications, as described 
above, regarding the draft law to combat violence against women.321 
Enabling legislation plays a crucial role in securing legal equality. A 
constitution on paper is hardly a constitution at all, however progressive its 
contents and however careful its design. Though there is consensus that enabling 
legislation is crucial to securing legal equality, such a task requires the reform of 
old laws as well as the passage of new laws providing assistance to pressing 
public concerns. The state, for all of its aspirations, has struggled to tackle both 
simultaneously, while in the background sort itself out internally. Laws out of 
sync with the constitution but not deemed critical have thus been placed on the 
backburner. Government efforts under the current ruling coalition Nidaa Tounes 
have more or less been dictated by realities on the ground, a game of whack-a-
mole with a central focus on fighting terrorism, weeding out corruption, 
resolving bad debt, and increasing employment. 
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Hela Hammi, one of the most vocal proponents of women’s rights in the 
assembly, commented that “for right now, we are leaving women’s rights efforts 
in the hands of civil society, with government encouragement and support of 
course. This is partly because of prioritization, but partly because civil society 
organizations are tapped in.” 322 
Some gender issues, carried over from the Ben Ali era, continue to hold 
some political weight. The draft law against violence323 and new efforts add 
vertical parity to election laws,324 both discussed in Part I, and have gained 
relevance as an issue tied to universal security concerns. Other issues such as the 
mirath, or inheritance laws, wage disparities, and benefits for mothers in the 
workplace, such as maternity leave, are discussed but have not been fully 
addressed in legislation thus far.325 Administrative judge and women’s activist 
Anware Mnasri argues that the mirath laws are not a widely debated issue 
among Tunisians – they are considered problematic for poor families, but that 
the bigger issue is giving women an equal opportunity in the labor market and 
improving the economy so that people do not have to rely on mirath.326 
Some have pushed for increasing maternity leave as a part of reform in 
public services law.327 At 30 days, currently Tunisia has the shortest maternity 
leave of all countries in the MENA region.328 Civil servants are allowed 60 days 
leave and can extend for another 60 days with a 50 percent reduction of their 
wages.329 Policies that permit institutionalized forms of gender discrimination 
are the most important policies for women’s rights activists to overcome. Yet, 
because they are not as visible as political discrimination or as shocking as cases 
of sexual violence, they may also be the most difficult issues to tackle. 
There is some acknowledgment that Tunisia’s new era of gender rights 
rides on guarantees under the old regime: “We don’t like to admit it, but some 
laws from the Ben Ali years have benefitted women. Ben Ali was selective with 
which laws he chose to support, enacting laws to further his own political 
interests, but the effect of these laws has been positive.”330 Examples include a 
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law requiring a minimum standard of pediatric health for newborns, a law 
allowing women to travel without her husband or father, and a set of policies 
that opened up educational opportunities to women.331 
Given the plethora of concerns and reformist initiatives in the pipeline, it is 
important to mandate a specific time period for the promulgation of institutions 
and policies. Independent bodies for the enforcement and oversight of 
constitutional rights, such as commissions and ombudsperson bodies, should be 
passed in a timely manner. For example, the 1992 Constitution of Ghana called 
for laws establishing nine institutions within six months of the first meeting of 
the parliament after its constitution came into effect.332 The 2010 Constitution of 
Kenya included a time schedule from six months to three years within which 
laws on more than sixty subjects were to be passed, and it provided a cause of 
action if a law listed in the schedule was not promulgated within the time 
specified.333 
Additionally, there must be a constitutional review of the legal system to 
ensure that all laws are in compliance with constitutional guarantees and if 
necessary the repeal of laws that are inconsistent with the Constitution. 
Finally, steps should be taken to monitor the implementation of the 
constitution.  It is important to carry out a regular evaluation of institutions 
established under the constitutions to ensure that they have the resources, 
including financial and human resources, to implement the constitutional 
guarantees. For example, Section 5 of the sixth schedule of the 2010 Kenyan 
Constitution calls for a commission on the implementation of the constitution to 
“monitor, facilitate and oversee the development of legislation and 
administrative procedures as required to implement the Constitution.”334 
Remedies for inaction on the part of the government in meeting 
constitutional guarantees create a remedy for non-enforcement of rights. 
Constitutional courts can be moved through a writ petition or, as in India, where 
Article 32 (1) provides that the right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate 
proceedings for the enforcement of the rights is guaranteed.335 
D. A Focus on Gender and Economic Rights 
Tunisian women’s rights activists are concerned that the debates on 
constitutional guarantees have not focused sufficiently on economic 
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development and its corresponding impact on women.336 Development 
initiatives ranging from the expansion of global trade, to structural readjustment 
programs, to a diversion of public spending from social to military programs, all 
have a disproportionate impact on women and the burdens they carry. While the 
discourse on women’s rights often centers on a narrow range of ‘genderized’ 
issues such as sexual violence, women’s political participation, and 
discriminatory rape laws, there is a need to acknowledge that gender-neutral 
policies can have equally negative implications. All issues, be it social, 
economic, political, or legal, have wider, gender-based implications that must be 
assessed within their specific local contexts. 
The question of how to pair economic development with women’s rights 
ties in to concerns around social stability and security. A Pew poll showed that 
69 percent of women in Tunisia (compared to 55 percent of men) prefer stability 
to democracy, although their conceptions of stability and security are different 
from that of men – for example, women see security as the ability to go out 
alone, to be free from harassment on the street, at work, and on the part of 
police.337 Men see security as more the presence of a police force and a reduced 
threat of terrorism.338 This did not, however, correlate with waning support for 
equal rights for women (66 percent), a fair judiciary, and competitive 
elections.339 Nevertheless, a preference for stability over democracy leaves open 
the possibility for women to forgo ideological agendas that require long-term 
foresight in exchange for practical, short-term solutions.340 
Preference for stability is increasing in light of Tunisia’s economy, which 
has stagnated if not receded since the revolution. High unemployment rates 
among young women, reaching 50 percent in some areas, have created 
increasing dependence on male figures in their household as the primary 
breadwinners.341 The situation is particularly volatile for women in Tunisia’s 
historically underserved and economically repressed interior regions. 
Agricultural work – mainly on small plots or family farms – provides 
employment for the vast majority of women laborers in this region. Women 
activists in rural areas and in the capital are grappling with how to undo decades 
of state-intervention that has led to price distortion, inequitable profit 
distributions, and substandard working conditions for women in this sector.342 
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Habiba Mizoumi, National Secretary General for Dentists & Nurses for the 
UGTT, has also felt that gender equality must be approached holistically and has 
worked within her role to weave health and other welfare services into economic 
development proposals. “You can’t rid society of gender based violence and 
expand rights for women without improving the economy and a woman’s ability 
to participate within it. So we have to think about all of these aims at once.”343 
She says the key to UGTT’s strength has been its vast network that allows even 
those at the national level to interact with laborers in remote areas at the “bottom 
rung” of Tunisia’s economy. “I work with midwives, nurses, and other wage 
laborers in hospitals across the country. It is eye opening to hear their concerns, 
hear about their working conditions, and identify what their interests are.” 
Nevertheless, the approach to infusing gender initiatives within economic 
development is not systematic. As noted by Hammi, the government has not 
tackled gender as a cross-sector issue, but rather as a separate item to be dealt 
with after more pressing issues have been addressed.344 
This fear that gender equality and security takes second place to other 
issues that are considered more pressing is concerning and haunts many 
communities in post conflict and transitional justice. However, unless gender 
equality is treated as an imperative to democracy building and the rule of law, 
security cannot be sustained. 
E. The Need for Accelerated Civil Society Engagement 
Women are often mobilized during revolutions and nationalist struggles, 
but afterwards they are re-marginalized. Common themes emerge from research 
into women’s participation in revolutionary struggles: men may be reluctant to 
embrace women’s participation in the struggle, but do so in order to reach the 
desired and common goal.345 The re-emergence of male prerogative follows the 
achievement of the goal and any attempt to deal with women’s subordination is 
viewed as a distraction from the struggle, and revolutionary rhetoric fails to 
translate into post-conflict policy changes.346  However, women who 
participated in revolutionary struggles often develop a political awareness that 
changes the construction of the political community. 
Women who feel marginalized by the transitional process have turned to 
civil society activism.  Efforts in Tunisia seem to focus on increasing youth 
voter turnout in the next elections, pushing for horizontal parity layered on top 
of vertical parity to increase women political representation, and passing laws 
against violence against women. 
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F. Building Institutions 
The promise of the Tunisian Constitution can only be attained through 
institutional design. For example, in Scotland, the Standing Orders of the 
Parliament mandate that all bills are accompanied by a statement of their 
potential impact on equal opportunities, including gender equality.347 Similarly, 
Section 187 of the South African Constitution called for the setting up of a 
Commission for Gender Equality and its role is to monitor, investigate, research, 
educate, lobby, advise and report on issues concerning gender equality.348 
Tunisia’s transition has largely centered on its Law on Establishing and 
Organizing Transitional Justice, passed during the last days of the Ennahda 
government on December 24, 2013. One of its most critical provisions allows 
for criminal accountability for past human rights violations.349 Chambers in the 
civil court system will have the jurisdiction to adjudicate past violations and 
abuses by military and security forces. The law also includes provisions for 
victim reparation,350 institutional reform, vetting of civil servants,351 and national 
reconciliation.352 
The Truth Commission was intended to be one of the primary mechanisms 
established under the new law to dismantle the old regime and pave the way for 
transition. Its task is to uncover past abuses committed from independence in 
July 1955 to 2013. It is composed of a 15-member panel of human rights 
activists, representatives of opposition associations under the Ben Ali regime, 
and independent jurists.353 The powers of the commission are broad, including 
the ability to subpoena witnesses, access state archives, summon public 
hearings, provide protections for testifiers, and even reopen past cases, though 
some challenge this as unconstitutional.354 Finally, the commission can refer 
gross violations to specialized chambers, which have yet to be formed.355 The 
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deadline was last set for the end of 2015.356 The law mandates that judges for 
such chambers cannot have “participated in trials of a political nature,” but it 
does not specify further.357 
The commission’s formation and validity, however, have been subject to 
strict scrutiny. Individuals who participated in the Ben Ali regime and continue 
to hold positions in government expressed concern that they would be unfairly 
targeted. Many critics who later formed part of the Nidaa Tounes coalition 
pushed to amend the commission rules and replace its members. “There was a 
lot of drama between Essebsi and the commission’s president Sihem Ben 
Sedrine. He accused her of conspiring with Marzouki [the former president], 
being too radical, too driven by her own vendettas, and on and on,”358 
commented one journalist following the commission’s developments. Others 
question her ability to guide the commission with adequate insight, given her 
prolonged absence outside of Tunisia prior to 2011.359 There is some 
acknowledgment that the media in Tunisia has been particularly hostile towards 
the Commission, fueling further public skepticism.360 Juan E. Mendez, UN 
Special Rapporteur on Torture expressed his concerns in 2014 and called for a 
need for “impartial, thorough investigations,” noting that “[t]orture and ill 
treatment continues to take place in Tunisia” and that in spite of this reality he 
remained hopeful that the commission would bring “access to justice and redress 
for victims.”361 
To smooth over tensions, on May 25, 2015 the Minister of Justice released 
a statement on the state’s ongoing efforts in the realm of transitional justice, 
including its commitment to bring expert judges on transitional justice into the 
process and to create spaces for civil society groups to access information and 
give feedback on judiciary reform and the dignity and rehabilitation fund.362 
Closed-door testimonies began in May 2015, with public hearings 
following in June. Since hearings began, over 20,000 victims have come 
forward as testament of the state’s systematic use of sexual violence to silence 
women members of the opposition.363 Although the details of these hearings is 
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beyond the scope of this Article, the establishment of the commission and its 
work, though politically polarizing, logistically incoherent, and as of yet 
incomplete, has been noted as a “rare opportunity to push forward new rights 
claims for Tunisian women that move beyond the secular/Islamic division.”364 
CONCLUSION 
The historic exclusion of women from official peace processes and 
constitutional reform processes brings into question the validity of the model 
upon which constitutional processes rest. A review of fourteen peace 
negotiations since 1992 shows that less than 8 percent of the negotiating teams 
were women and less than 3 percent of the signatories were women.  It is then 
not surprising that “of the 585 peace agreements signed since 1990, only 92 
mention women.”365 
Tunisia’s constitutional process provided the terrain for the coalescence of 
women as a critical presence. It was a moving, diverse, and electrifying terrain 
upon which women gathered across political divides to build common cause. 
The constitution-making process provided a landscape for women to move their 
concerns from the margin to the center of the constitutional debates and to 
articulate a visionary and detailed agenda for action. The official constitution 
has laid the groundwork for future work, but much more must be done to ensure 
that women’s rights that exist in theory come to exist in reality. 
What the Tunisian constitution-drafting project shows is that women’s 
participation in constitution-making is critical to ensuring women’s rights and 
priorities are included in a nationwide dialogue.  The very legitimacy of a 
constitution hinges on whether women are engaged in the creation, adoption and 
implementation of their constitutions. Nevertheless, we should resist 
characterizing the nature of women’s participation in constitution-making 
uniformly. Women were present on both sides of the debate. Perhaps their 
greatest contribution was in ensuring that everyone’s voice was heard and one 
narrative did not wholly drown out the other. 
Similarly, international actors can aid constitution-making processes by 
protecting and promoting processes that are both democratic and transparent. 
International women’s groups can also provide needed resources and technical 
support. Of course, while transnational groups are helpful in building 
transnational coalitions, they in no way stand as a proxy to national and local 
civil society groups. National and local NGOs should lead efforts to galvanize 
existing women’s groups and form broad-based coalitions. Transnational groups 
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should only step in as second-fiddle supporters who can further assist or 
facilitate such grassroots efforts. This will be important to note with the growing 
number of local participants in Tunisia’s women’s rights discourse and the 
emergence of transnational solidarity links. 
Meaningful participation of women in the Constitution drafting in Tunisia 
involved two singular aspects: (1) women in the constituent assembly and (2) an 
active and organized coalition of women’s groups.  Although women in the 
constituent assembly symbolized the state’s commitment to gender equality, the 
mere appointment of women to the body was insufficient.  The most vital aspect 
in this project was an effective coalition of women’s groups. The open forums 
are an educational opportunity for the entire country and they allowed for debate 
and discussion on issues that were considered outside the public realm.  As 
founding mothers of a landmark constitution, the involvement of women 
energized and empowered women like never before and had significant 
influence on raising constitutive and transformative aspects of constitution 
drafting. However, if the process is to be truly transformative, women must 
continue to participate beyond the initial promulgation of the constitution. 
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